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ABSTRACT
It is generally believed that the judicial review of agency
rulemakings helps protect the public interest against industry
capture. Yet very little empirical research has been done to assess the
accuracy of this conventional wisdom. This Study examines the
entire set of air toxic emission regulations promulgated by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), with particular attention
to those rules appealed to judgment in the court of appeals, and
discovers significant disconnects between popular understanding of
judicial review and rulemaking reality. Of these air toxic rules
(N=90), the courts were summoned to review only a small fraction
(8%), despite evidence that many air toxic rules may have problems,
at least from the public interest perspective. Moreover, although
virtually all of the litigation brought by public interest groups
against the EPA’s air toxic rules was successful, the resulting
victories have not yet had much impact in practice. For most of its
vacated regulations, the EPA has either ignored or limited the courts’
opinions and has not repromulgated revised rules. Thus, while the
tenor of the opinions seems to reaffirm the courts’ role as guardian of
the public interest the actual impact of these opinions on agency
practice may be less influential than one might expect. A concluding
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section takes the analysis one step further and explores the possibility
that the net effect of judicial review may actually be more perverse.
The ability of the dominant parties (which in the case of the EPA’s
air toxic rules are regulated industries) to threaten the agency with
expensive and time-consuming litigation could provide these groups
with legal leverage that, in the aggregate, serves to further under-
mine the agency’s ability to act on behalf of the public interest. 
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INTRODUCTION
The judicial expansion of standing in the 1970s radically altered
administrative process. A legal system available only to regulated
industries seeking to protect their narrow interests against agency
abuse1 was transformed into a process that allowed all affected
parties, including public interest groups, to challenge agency rules
in court.2 The risk that the agency could now be sued by all affected
parties, rather than just by regulated interests, was expected to
cause agencies to be both more solicitous of and more receptive to
the views of all stakeholders.3 Equally beneficial, when an agency
did ignore stakeholder input, the agency could be forced to explain
its decision to the courts.4 This new, broader form of judicial review
was expected to play a particularly important institutional check
against capture by regulated parties.5
Although there is vigorous debate about whether this pluralistic
model—initially dubbed the “interest group representation model”—
is the best one for administrative process,6 there seems to be tacit
agreement among commentators that this model generally describes
1. See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1669-70 (1975). Professor Stewart calls this older model of judicial
review the “traditional model,” in which only regulated parties are able to seek judicial review
of agency actions to protect their economic interests. Id. (“The traditional model ... has sought
to reconcile the competing claims of governmental authority and private autonomy by
prohibiting official intrusions on private liberty or property unless authorized by legislative
directives.”).
2. See id. at 1723 (“The transformation of the traditional model into a model of interest
representation has in large degree been achieved through an expansion of the class of
interests entitled to seek judicial review of agency action.”).
3. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1039, 1043 (1997) (describing how this liberalized standing and expanded judicial
review attempted to root out industry capture of agency officials by regulated parties).
4. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: Restoring
Faith in Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689, 695 (2000).
5. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 3, at 1043.
6. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Structuring a “Dense Complexity”: Accountability and the
Project of Administrative Law, ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Mar. 2005, at 1, 2, http://www.
bepress.com/ils/iss6/art4/ (discussing various problems associated with the interest group
representation model); Mark Seidenfeld, The Quixotic Quest for a “Unified” Theory of the
Administrative State, ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Mar. 2005, at 1, 14-15, http://www.
bepress.com/ils/iss6/art2/ (discussing other normative visions that could replace the interest
group model and concluding that no “unified” theory will likely emerge). 
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what occurs on the ground.7 Yet central features of the pluralistic
model remain unsubstantiated as an empirical matter.8 In order for
the model to provide an even partly accurate description of rule-
making processes, for example, a diverse set of interests must
regularly engage with the agency in ways that can be backed by an
appeal if the agency ignores those interests. When a court reviews
an agency’s rule at the behest of stakeholders, moreover, the court’s
opinion should have some impact on the agency’s future decision
making. If these assumptions do not pan out in administrative
reality, then the current model of administrative process may need
some reexamination. 
Growing evidence suggests, in fact, that administrative practice
may be quite different from what conventional wisdom supposes.
Several different empirical studies that examined regulations over
the last five years have identified a distinct “bias towards business”
running through rules promulgated by several different regulatory
agencies. This bias should not exist if pluralistic engines are
running effectively.9 One of the leading explanatory factors for this
tilt in influence is the fact of judicial review itself. To the extent that
each comment serves as a placeholder for litigation, influence cor-
7. See, e.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATION 45-54 (1988) (describing the pluralistic and post-pluralistic models of judicial
review, both of which depend on a constellation of diverse interest groups to engage with and
ultimately sue the agencies); Elizabeth Magill, Images of Representation, ISSUES LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP, Mar. 2005, at 1, 2, http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss6/art5/ (“To say that
representation of those affected by governance is a theme running through many schools of
thought is not to say that we have a neatly worked out theory of interest representation. Far
from it.”); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Of Gift Horses and Great Expectations: Remands Without
Vacatur in Administrative Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 609 (2004) (“Few believe that agencies
are, in the terminology of Richard Stewart, writing a quarter century ago, mere ‘transmission
belts’ for interest group influences”; instead, most view agency decision processes as involving
some form of pluralistic microbargaining.). The earliest incarnation of the pluralistic
model—the interest group representation model—morphed into subsequent variations that
still relied on a diverse set of stakeholders to bring the claims, but these variations involved
less judicial activism, particularly on the public interest side. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note
4, at 707, 714-15 (describing a counterreformation in the 1980s that remains tethered to a
basic pluralistic model of oversight but differs on the level of judicial scrutiny). 
8. See infra Part III.
9. See, e.g., Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s
Air Toxic Emission Standards, 3 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 125 (2011); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan
Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S.
Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 128 (2006) (identifying a “bias towards business”).
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responds to the number of forceful commenters: badly imbalanced
stakeholder input into rules may lead to imbalanced outputs
because of, not in spite of, judicial review.10 Additionally, evidence
of agency nonacquiescence—an action by an agency that simply
rejects or ignores adverse court precedent—calls into question
whether the courts’ direct interventions really do change the
agencies’ decision making. If agencies are not terribly worried about
adverse court rulings, then this fact also alters how one understands
the impact of judicial review on the rulemaking process.11 
Given this preliminary evidence that calls into question whether
the pluralistic model accurately describes what is going on in
practice, there is reason to want to learn more. This Study begins
the effort by examining the agency-court-interest group interactions
in an entire set of air toxic emission standards promulgated under
the Clean Air Act by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).12
These standards affect public health directly, but data show that the
rules receive far greater input from industry than from public
interest groups.13 In such a skewed participatory regime, the courts’
role as guardian of the public interest becomes particularly impor-
tant. In an effort to study judicial review’s capacity to protect the
public interest, the Study examines the litigated air toxic rules and
sets these rules against the interest group-agency interactions
occurring in the larger set of ninety air toxic standards promulgated
by the EPA.14
The findings reveal that interactions between interest groups,
agencies, and the courts do not always operate as expected. In a
small number of rules, public interest appeals powerfully highlight
ways that the agency violated basic statutory terms in its devel-
opment of air toxic emission standards, just as the interest group
representation model predicted.15 Surprisingly, however, the courts’
precedent and remands do not appear to exert much of an impact on
agency decision making and in some cases seem to be effectively
10. See infra Part III.C.
11. See infra Part III.B.2.
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (2006) (outlining these emission standards for air toxins).
13. See infra Appendix 2; see also Wagner et al., supra note 9, at 132 (discussing this
finding in a related study).
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.A.1.
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ignored.16 The data also expose stark imbalances in interest group
engagement across rules and, in turn, suggest that the courts are
not always on hand to enforce the interests of all affected parties.17
Although some of the EPA rules are subject to pluralistic bargaining
that matches what seems to be imagined by the interest group
representation model, the majority do not.18 Instead, the bulk of the
rules are hammered out between regulated interests and agency
officials with no input from other groups—a type of regulatory
oversight that seems more akin to the defunct, traditional model
than to its more modern replacement.19
The possibility that judicial review inadvertently causes advan-
taged groups to enjoy even greater legal leverage in a large subset
of rulemakings, while providing only limited oversight of agency
decisions in a smaller subset of rules, is supported in four Parts. The
first Part considers the basic literature surrounding judicial review
and explores some of the basic empirical assumptions underlying
the current pluralistic model of judicial review. The second Part
provides an overview of the Study and explains the methods. The
third Part discusses empirical findings from the research. Finally,
the fourth Part considers what the findings suggest about con-
ventional understandings of the impact of judicial review on agency
rulemakings, particularly with respect to the courts’ role in ad-
vancing the public interest.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKINGS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE
Judicial review is considered a critical institutional mechanism
for holding agencies accountable to all affected parties, including the
broader public. In its most idealized form, judicial review serves as
an institutional check to ensure that agencies provide information
to interested parties, take parties’ input seriously, and in the end,
offer cogent and accessible explanations for their decisions, thus
allowing the political process to engage in oversight of these
16. See infra Part III.B.1.
17. See infra Part III.A.2.
18. See infra Part IV.B.
19. See infra Part IV.B.
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otherwise obscure bureaucratic decisions.20 Judicial review also
ensures that the agencies stay within reasonable bounds in their
interpretation of statutory directives; without the courts to police
these statutory edges, lawlessness could result.21 Liberalized stand-
ing rules, coupled with relatively accessible and low-cost access to
the courts for stakeholders, allow interest groups of all sizes and
resource levels to challenge unfair rules and raise them for public
scrutiny.22 This is particularly important for complex rules that
otherwise might be badly skewed in favor of regulated parties.23
Cases such as Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe stand
as a testament to the ability of local community organizations and
citizen activists to hold Washington bureaucrats accountable when
they ignore the law.24
Despite the vital institutional role that courts play in the admin-
istrative state, there has been a dearth of investigation into what is
actually occurring at the agency-court interface in practice.25
20. See, e.g., Thomas O. Sargentich, The Critique of Active Judicial Review of
Administrative Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 599, 641 (1997) (“Having to
conform to the authorizing statute, requisite procedures, and reasoned elaboration
requirements can temper tendencies toward arbitrariness, special interest deals, or other
behaviors in tension with an agency’s overt statutory mission.”). Nearly 40% of the vacaturs
of agency regulations apparently occur because the agency failed to adequately explain or
document its reasoning. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in the Time of Cholera,
49 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 665 (1997).
21. See generally Sargentich, supra note 20, at 634 (“Active judicial review can help to
deter the worst abuses of power and to give staff inside an agency levers with which to
bargain in the development of policy that serves statutory aims.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 63 (1985) (touting the value of judicial
review to combat capture-like problems that might otherwise afflict agencies).
22. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 7, at 51 (describing this pluralistic grounding of judicial
review and also the hope that, rather than advancing only narrow interests, some groups will
“push for the right rather than their own particular interests”); Stewart, supra note 1, at 1755
(“By affording all affected interests with a recognized stake in agency policy the right to
demand and participate in such procedures ... [the courts] facilitate effective judicial review
of asserted agency laxity or bias.”).
23. Cf. William T. Gormley, Jr., Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System, 18 POLITY
595, 607-08 (1986) (providing a two-by-two chart that identifies rules with low salience and
high complexity as subject to imbalanced oversight that will generally tip in favor of regulated
parties).
24. 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (holding that citizen group had standing to challenge
Department of Transportation’s failure to comply with statutory requirements governing
disbursement of federal highway transportation funds to construct a highway through a park),
abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
25. See, e.g., STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 125-33 (2008)
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Professor Jerry L. Mashaw warns that as a result of this gap be-
tween theory and empirical knowledge about the impact of judicial
review, “[d]octrinal discussions ... [may ultimately] seem like
cartoons when laid beside the occasional empirical investigation of
agency operation.”26
This Section lays out the promise of judicial review in theory and
highlights some of the unanswered questions regarding its oper-
ation in practice.
A. Basics of Judicial Review
Although the scrutiny courts give to agency rules has ebbed and
flowed over time, the underlying principle that the courts stand as
a check on agency discretion has remained a constant theme over
the last seven decades.27 The courts accomplish this oversight in
large part by reviewing challenges to agency rulemakings and other
actions.28 In most settings, virtually any affected party can chal-
lenge a problematic rule and ask the court to determine whether the
rulemaking is arbitrary or otherwise out of line with the authorizing
statute.29 In this way, the agency confronts limits to its discretion
(discussing various methodological and data barriers to studying the administrative process
and outlining the limited empirical research that is available); ROBERT J. HUME, HOW COURTS
IMPACT FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 2-3 (2009) (referencing the need for better
empirical understanding of how agencies respond to courts and focusing his study on agency
responses to “opinion language”); Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial
Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1245-47 (1999) (arguing that the “existence of
authority for courts to review agency rulemaking is broadly presumed” and lacks rigorous
theoretical and empirical support); Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of
Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501,
536 (2005) (“[W]e now know very little about agency interpretive practice.”).
26. Mashaw, supra note 25, at 536.
27. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 17-19, 21-26 (7th ed. 2011) (describing administrative law’s
chronological development, which highlights the importance of judicial review in the
contemporary evolution of administrative law).
28. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
29. Standing is a legally complicated concept, but in most informal rulemakings the
affected parties—with a little foresight—can participate in ways that assure they will have
standing to file an appeal if they should so desire. See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.4, at 139-71 (4th ed. 2004) (describing the law of
standing in administrative law).
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that are enforced by interested parties and adjudicated by
disinterested generalist judges.
Initially, in the 1940s when the Administrative Procedure Act
was first passed,30 the courts’ role was oriented primarily toward
protecting the interests of regulated parties against arbitrary
agency action (the traditional model),31 but with the rise of social
regulation in the 1960s and 1970s, the courts’ role shifted to become
much more focused on serving as a critical counterforce to agency
capture.32 Apparently motivated by a sense that agencies would
benefit from greater public interest-oriented oversight, the courts,
acting on their own volition, liberalized standing rules to allow any
aggrieved party to challenge arbitrary agency action.33 Expanded
standing was followed soon after by the courts’ increasingly aggres-
sive scrutiny of agency rules and analyses.34 Some courts even gave
a “hard look” to agency rules to ensure that the agency had docu-
mented its fact-finding, explained its logic, and duly considered all
contrary evidence.35 Growing indications of the special interest cap-
ture of agencies convinced some judges that too much deference to
agency experts would systematically allow agencies to lean too far
in the direction of regulated parties.36 These cumulative devel-
opments—both broader standing and a harder look at agency rules
—led to the reformation of administrative law, transforming the
courts’ role from the guarantor of narrow, due process protections,
which were available only to regulated parties, to the full-scale
30. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
31. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 1, at 1715-16 (spotlighting “the expansion of standing
to seek judicial review of agency action” as one of the central elements in the transformation
of the traditional model of administrative law with respect to agency rulemakings).
34. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(“What we are entitled to at all events is a careful identification by the Secretary, when his
proposed standards are challenged, of the reasons why he chooses to follow one course rather
than another.”).
35. For a critical assessment of the hard look doctrine, see 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4, at 593-97 (5th ed. 2010).
36. See, e.g., R. Shep Melnick, Courts and Agencies, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW 89,
93-94 (Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes eds., 2004) (describing the courts’ concern about possible
industry capture).
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institutional gatekeeper that holds agencies accountable to the
public at large.37
During this early reformation period, public interest groups
seemed to emerge from the woodwork to defend the rights of the
diffuse public against capture and other lapses in agency judg-
ment.38 Indeed, the prevalence of these groups—although seemingly
defying collective action theory—led analysts to celebrate the
resulting “interest group representation” model and the pluralistic
transformation of administrative law.39 Professor James Q. Wilson,
for example, observes how the “EPA has had to deal with as many
complaints and lawsuits from environmentalists as from industry,
despite the economic and political advantages industry presumably
enjoys.”40 In their study of interest group politics, Professors Burdett
A. Loomis and Allan J. Cigler conclude that by the early 1980s, a
“participation revolution” had arisen comprised of citizens and
special interest groups seeking “collective material benefits” for the
public at large.41 Professor Christopher J. Bosso observes in his
study of pesticide politics that “[b]y the mid-1980s, ... we find a
diversity in representation that, on the surface at least, gives
pluralists some vindication.”42 The possibility that at some point in
the future, public interest groups might not be able to keep up with
regulated parties seemed unlikely in light of the unexpected
abundance of public watchdogs. Most of the concerns about the rep-
resentative capacity of the public interest groups were instead
preoccupied with the possibility that these public interest groups
37. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 1, at 1758 (“[T]he requirement that agencies give
adequate consideration to all affected interests, and in particular, the interests of the
intended beneficiaries of an administrative scheme, has been utilized by the courts with
increasing frequency to redress perceived agency favoritism to organized interests.”).
38. See Burdett A. Loomis & Allan J. Cigler, The Changing Nature of Interest Group
Politics, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 1, 10-11 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 7th
ed. 2007).
39. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 1760-61.
40. James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 385
(James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
41. Loomis & Cigler, supra note 38, at 11. 
42. CHRISTOPHER J. BOSSO, PESTICIDES AND POLITICS: THE LIFE CYCLE OF A PUBLIC ISSUE
245 (1987). This is in part because “[e]nvironmental policies, by their nature, prompt acrid
disputes among equally determined and almost permanently mobilized sets of claimants
because they exhibit structures of incentives more contagious to conflict than do agricultural
subsidies or water projects.” Id. at 252.
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would advance goals that were not fully representative of or might
even be in conflict with the diffuse public.43 There were also con-
cerns that the resulting great waves of diverse pluralistic oversight
might be too cumbersome and resource intensive for the agencies to
manage.44
The view of courts as the last bastions against agency capture
subsided somewhat in the 1980s and beyond.45 After more than a
decade of experience, there were concerns that the courts’ review
actually produced unintended side effects that might cause ag-
gressive review to become more of a problem than a solution. For ex-
ample, some scholars worried that “hard look” review could paralyze
an agency, which in turn would lead to substantial delays in regu-
lation writing and a general ossification of the rulemaking process.46
Some prominent commenters, including members of the judiciary,
also became concerned that public interest challenges that pur-
ported to represent the broader interests of the diffuse public
focused the agency on trivial risks at the expense of more important
economic and environmental priorities.47 Both of these perspectives
43. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 1, at 1764-70 (discussing problems that flow from the
fact that “‘[p]ublic interest’ advocates ... do not represent—and do not claim to represent—the
interests of the community as a whole”). Although Professor Stewart does highlight the
likelihood that resources of these fragmented groups will not allow them to provide “adequate
representation of all those interests significantly affected by agency decisions,” id. at 1764,
he does not elaborate on how the complete absence of such representatives will lead to a
model that is so different from the traditional model. His attention instead turns to the
enormous discretion the groups enjoy with respect to prioritizing issues of interest to the
general public. Id. 
44. One of Stewart’s primary concerns with the interest group representation model was
not whether it would be utilized by a diverse constituency as much as that it would be used
by so many diverse interests that the development of uniform rules of decision by the courts
would become effectively impossible. See, e.g., id. at 1778-79 (expressing concern about how
court rulings might resist “regular ordering” and therefore lack coherent criteria for
resolution).
45. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 3, at 1041 (describing a “significant retrenchment” from
the judicial activity that characterized the pre-1983 period to post-1983 activity that provided
agencies with greater deference).
46. See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1410-14 (1992) (detailing concerns that hard look review could
effectively paralyze agency rulemakings).
47. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 33, 50-51 (1993) (describing how public perceptions trigger a “vicious circle” of
legislation and regulation of trivial risks that imposes unjustified costs on regulated parties);
Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L.
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counseled for more, not less, deference to agency decisions.48 Finally,
a series of empirical studies revealed statistically significant cor-
relations between court of appeals rulings and the ideological bent
of the judicial panel.49 This potential partisan bias in the appellate
courts’ review of agency rules also counseled for greater deference
to agencies given the political qualities of much agency decision
making.50
Although the role of the courts in advancing the public interest
has become less aggressive since the early 1970s, the image of
courts as public guardians nevertheless persists.51 Much of the con-
temporary commentary on the role of the courts understands that
courts serve as an important institutional counterforce to the
powerful, heavily invested industries that pressure the agency
throughout the rulemaking process.52 Whether the courts scrutinize
the agency’s decision closely or at arm’s length, the objective of
providing some check on agency power is a continuous theme.53 
B. Unreviewed Assumptions
Lurking behind this conceptualization of the courts as guardians
of the public interest are basic, yet largely unexplored, questions
about how agencies and courts actually behave.54
REV. 683, 741-43 (1999) (discussing how salient and accessible claims about environmental
risks can cascade to unsupported urgent calls for regulation of trivial risks).
48. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 46, at 1451-54.
49. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency
Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 88-90 (2011) (summarizing the empirical study of
partisan bias in appellate panels in their review of agency rulemakings).
50. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 25, at 1269-76, 1301-06, 1309-13 (discussing evidence of
ideological bias in appellate court decisions and discussing the implications for judicial
review); Earl M. Maltz, The Supreme Court and the Quality of Political Dialogue, 5 CONST.
COMMENT. 375, 387 (1988) (noting how the dialogic justification for the courts depends on the
neutrality of the judiciary).
51. See, e.g., Sargentich, supra note 20, at 642 (“[T]he courts are the major national
institutions designed to uphold law-governed limits on agency discretion, to protect individual
rights, and to review executive power in the name of checks and balances.”); see also supra
note 7.
52. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 3, at 1043; Sargentich, supra note 20, at 641.
53. See, e.g., Sargentich, supra note 20, at 642 (arguing that benefits of judicial review
outweigh the costs). But see Cross, supra note 25, at 1281-90 (identifying and criticizing this
key assumption that courts are an essential mechanism for checking agency action).
54. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency-Centered or Court-Centered Administrative Law?
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For example, the pluralistic or interest group representation
model, by its terms, depends on a sufficient number of public in-
terest groups to at least threaten, if not use, liberalized standing
rules to check agency abuses of discretion. In Professor Stewart’s
words, “the transformation of the traditional model into a model of
interest representation has in large degree been achieved through
an expansion of the class of interests entitled to seek judicial review
of agency action.”55 But if these groups are wholly absent from the
rulemaking process despite liberalized standing and the relevance
of the rules to the broader public interest,56 it is difficult to under-
stand how the resulting approach to administrative oversight will
be much different from the traditional due-process model that
preceded the reformation. In fact, growing evidence of imbalances
in the use of the notice-and-comment process by affected interest
groups for publicly important rules provides reason to be concerned
that all affected groups may not have equal access to the courts.57
Administrative law scholarship also offers several grounds for
concern that the agencies may not always comply with judicially im-
posed directives.58 A sizable body of nonacquiescence literature, for
example, suggests that agencies actually are quite bold about ex-
plicitly rejecting judicial precedent,59 even in intracircuit situations
A Dialogue with Richard Pierce on Agency Statutory Interpretation, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 889,
893 (2007) (“It seems to me not only odd, but perverse, that articles parsing the exquisite
subtleties of Chevron or Skidmore deference fill our law reviews, while virtually nothing is
said about the ways in which agencies should and do interpret the statutes in their charge.”
(citation omitted)).
55. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1723.
56. The relevance of these rules to the broader public interest is discussed below. See infra
notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Yackee & Yackee, supra note 9, at 131, 133 (studying forty lower-salience
rulemakings promulgated by four different federal agencies and finding that business
interests submitted 57% of comments, whereas nonbusiness or nongovernmental
organizations submitted 22% of comments, of which 6% came from public interest groups).
58. See generally HUME, supra note 25, at 36-37 (discussing the courts’ limited ability to
oversee compliance with their remedies).
59. See generally Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 681-84 (1989) (describing the nonacquiescence
phenomenon in detail); Samuel Figler, Executive Agency Nonacquiescence to Judicial
Opinions, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1664, 1664-66 (1993) (discussing nonacquiescence in general
and, in particular, the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) nonacquiescence in Johnson
v. U.S. Railroad Retirement Board, 969 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1992)); Nancy M. Modesitt, The
Hundred-Years War: The Ongoing Battle Between Courts and Agencies over the Right to
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when court rules are otherwise controlling.60 More subtle forms of
nonacquiescence that do not involve explicit rejections of adverse
precedent, but instead involve agency interpretations that dis-
tinguish precedent in creative ways, seem even more likely to be
used by an agency eager to protect its turf from judicial encroach-
ment.61 And in some settings there is even evidence that agencies
avoid informal rulemakings altogether to avoid the risk of a court
challenge.62
None of this is surprising since agencies face a number of other
pressures and sources of influence beyond judicial review.63 Thus,
although the courts undoubtedly impact agency choices,64 it is not
Interpret Federal Law, 74 MO. L. REV. 949, 961-62 & n.79 (2009) (reporting evidence of agency
nonacquiescence in more recent years).
60. See, e.g., Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 59, at 743-53 (discussing intracircuit
acquiescence in detail). For other specific accounts of agency nonacquiescence in more recent
years, see Modesitt, supra note 59, at 973-79 (describing nonacquiescence by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission); Kevin Haskins, Note, A “Delicate Balance”: How
Agency Nonacquiescence and the EPA’s Water Transfer Rule Dilute the Clean Water Act After
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 60 ME. L. REV. 173,
174-76 (2008) (describing the EPA’s nonacquiescence to precedent in defining water transfer
rules).
61. In their study of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) response to
judicial commands during the 1980s, for example, Professors DeShazo and Freeman outline
how FERC essentially behaved as if the adverse precedent that limited its discretion had
never happened. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 2217, 2247 (2005) (“One would think that such high profile lawsuits would have
prompted FERC to modify its behavior, even if Congress and the executive branch had
remained largely pro-power in their oversight. But FERC initially acted as if Scenic Hudson
[the 1965 Second Circuit case] had never happened. And it continued to drag its feet
throughout the ’70s as the adverse decisions mounted.”).
62. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case
of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 273-74 (1987) (discussing how judicial review
has caused the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to avoid
rulemaking in favor of recalls); Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule:
Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process, 1984
DUKE L.J. 163, 165-68, 194-98 (discussing how the procedural obstacles posed primarily by
judicial review and executive order led the Department of Energy to abandon policymaking
through rulemaking in favor of policymaking through individual adjudications by an office
authorized to make special exceptions to existing rules); see also Michael Asimow,
Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 389-90 (describing
how courts drive rulemaking underground); Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and
Informal Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 166-67 (2000) (same).
63. See infra Part III.B.2.
64. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 1758 (describing how courts have attempted to curb
agency favoritism).
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clear that the courts’ interpretations of an agency’s regulatory
authority constrain agency decision making in all, or even the
majority of rulemakings.65 Perhaps it is better to risk a remand or
vacatur, for example, than to anger an influential constituent or to
find oneself crosswise with the Chief Executive.66 Yet if the agencies
do not generally treat court reprimands as hard constraints on their
authority, then the benefits of judicial review will be greatly dimin-
ished.67 
Even the toll that judicial review takes on the agency’s workload,
particularly through the opportunity costs and drains from more
important projects,68 remains only partly understood. The cumu-
lative downsides that result, however, could well exceed the benefits
of judicial review in advancing the public interest.
Although there are a number of interesting and useful empirical
questions about the court-agency-interest group interface in the
current pluralistic model of judicial review, this Study focuses on
three questions in particular:
1. Does equal access to the courts exist in practice? The
effectiveness of court oversight depends on a relatively rigorous use
of the courts by a wide range of affected interests.69 If those most
aggrieved by lapses in agency judgments are not engaging in the
rulemaking or are not able to file appeals, then the benefits of judi-
cial review are diminished and in some policy areas could become
negative if courts are used primarily by the already-empowered
groups, like regulated parties.70 This is in fact quite possible,
65. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 54, at 890-91 (noting that despite its emphasis on
Chevron, the EPA “base[s] much of [its] agency interpretation on past agency practice,
technical or scientific understandings of statutory terms, and on legislative history”).
66. See id. at 891 (“[I]t seems normatively appropriate for agencies to give significant
deference to presidential directions concerning how they should interpret their statutes.”).
67. Professor Mashaw has noted the court-centeredness of most work on judicial review,
which almost totally misses the agency side of the partnership. See, e.g., id. at 891-93 (arguing
for greater study of agency practice). For example, although considerable effort is dedicated
to getting the deference standard right, there remains very little assurance that the agency
will respond in a straightforward way to these judicial instructions. See id. at 893.
68. See Cross, supra note 25, at 1280-81 (“Judicial review may also hinder the ability of
agencies to set a sensible regulatory agenda, may ignore political and practical constraints
on agency action, and may systematically produce rules of poorer quality.”).
69. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 1760-61, 1763.
70. Although the possibility of insufficient public interest group engagement seemed not
to be on the political or cultural horizon at the time that Professor Stewart wrote his classic
2012] AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 1733
because many of the representatives of the diffuse public have
limited resources and may not be able to engage in notice and
comment, much less appeal the rules to the courts.71 Whatever the
case, the effectiveness of courts as overseers seems to depend on the
ability of the full range of affected parties to use them. 
2. How does the agency react to judicial decisions? Even if public
interest groups are not engaged in all or even most rules, the court
precedent that emerges from the appeals can constrain agency
practice.72 The effectiveness of the courts thus also assumes that the
agencies will respond to judicial opinions.73 If agencies are inclined
to ignore court rulings, however, then the effectiveness of judicial
review may be much more limited.
3. Does the ever-looming threat of judicial review also operate to
undermine advancement of the public interest, however unintended?
The literature on ossification, as well as the costs of judicial activ-
ism documented by Dr. Shep Melnick several decades ago,74 attest
to the possibility of some unintended side effects associated with
judicial review that adversely affect the public interest.75 Yet the
extent to which these and other unintended effects of judicial review
article, he nevertheless identifies the importance of this representation in order to make the
interest group model work. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text. For example, he
notes, without elaboration, that in the interest group representation model, “the problem of
administrative procedure is to provide representation for all affected interests.” Stewart,
supra note 1, at 1759; see also id. at 1763-64 (“Broad participation rights do not, by any
means, ensure that all relevant interests will be represented before the agencies.”). Stewart
then suggests that public interest groups will generally be on hand to represent the diffuse
public, however incompletely, in many rulemaking settings. Id. at 1763, 1767-68 (rejecting the
need for subsidizing public interest groups, presumably because such subsidies are not needed
to ensure their engagement in most settings).
71. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1284-85 (2006) (discussing the limited resources of the public
in comparison to narrow interest groups).
72. See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 494 (2002).
73. See, e.g., id. at 547-48 (drawing a cautious but optimistic portrait, based on the larger
psychological literature, of how agencies are likely to respond rationally and favorably to
judicial review commands).
74. See B. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
343-45 (1983) (highlighting “unintended and undesirable consequences of court action”).
75. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 46, at 1419-20, 1426 (arguing that the costs associated
with judicial review will cause agency decision makers to “be reluctant to undertake new
rulemaking initiatives, to experiment with more flexible regulatory techniques, and to revisit
old rulemaking efforts”).
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actually undermine the courts’ ability to advance the public interest
is poorly understood.76 This type of grounded inquiry of the down-
sides of judicial review would seem to be a critical component in
evaluating competing doctrinal approaches and measuring the value
of judicial review itself.77
Basic models of institutional design remind us that unexamined
assumptions can sometimes cause an overarching, institutional
goal—like ensuring pluralistic oversight of agency discretion—to
move backward rather than forward if the facts diverge from what
is assumed.78 For example, if it turns out that judicial review is not
used by public interest groups in many public-benefitting areas,
then instead of advancing the public interest, judicial review may
be hijacked by regulated industry and used as a brickbat to keep the
agencies in line. Ultimately, doctrinal tests might need to be recal-
ibrated to correct imbalances by, for example, altering agency or
interest group incentives to participate or to appeal problematic
rules.79 Whatever the case, an empirically grounded understanding
of agency-court-interest group interactions provides information
that is useful in evaluating the design of administrative process. 
76. Currently, empirical research on the unintended side effects seems to focus primarily
on whether ossification actually exists. See, e.g., William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited:
Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve
Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 396 (2000)
(“[J]udicial review in the D.C. Circuit under the hard look version of the arbitrary and
capricious standard generally did not significantly impede agencies in the pursuit of their
policy goals during the decade [from 1985 to 1995].”); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles
of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889,
923 (2008) (challenging claims of ossification and highlighting the effects of political cycles,
particularly congressional cycles, on rulemaking activity).
77. See generally Cross, supra note 25, at 1244-47 (making this point before rejecting
individual justifications for judicial review of agency rules).
78. The theory of second best, for example, warns that imperfections in the real world that
are not accounted for in efforts to move a system towards greater economic efficiency could
actually cause reform efforts to have the opposite impact on efficiency. For an overview of the
theory, see RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, TRUTH OR ECONOMICS: ON THE DEFINITION, PREDICTION,
AND RELEVANCE OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 76-77 (2008). There are likely many critical, fact-
based assumptions embedded in the interest group representation model of judicial review,
as well as other models, such as the traditional model. The fact-based questions explored in
this Study are likely to be the tip of the iceberg in this respect.
79. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information
Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1406-09, 1416 (2010) (offering this type of preliminary proposal).
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II. THE STUDY
This Study examines the agency-court-interest group interaction
occurring in the EPA’s air toxic emissions rules, a set of regulations
that presents a good case for exposing constructive relationships
between these three sets of actors. With respect to interest group
participation, these rules regulate air toxic emissions from major
industrial facilities and thus have significant consequences for
public health.80 So, in the abstract, they would seem likely to gen-
erate considerable interest from the public interest and grassroots
communities.81 On the agency side, the EPA purports to be generally
responsive to court rulings82 and is generally viewed as biased in
favor of the public interest, at least in comparison to other agen-
cies.83 These qualities again would seem to make the EPA’s rules
more sensitive to the demands of the public interest groups and
responsive to court rulings that favor public interest groups. Finally,
on the court side, Congress vests challenges to the air toxic rules
exclusively with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,84
which is widely considered the premier circuit for the review of
complex agency rules.85 Together, these characteristics of the air
80. See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Hazardous Air Pollutants, Migrating Hot Spots,
and the Prospect of Data-Driven Regulation of Complex Industrial Complexes, 86 TEX. L. REV.
1445, 1445, 1449-52 (2008) (describing the pivotal role of air toxics in reducing health risks
and the resultant inadequacies in their enforcement).
81. See infra Figure 5 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., HUME, supra note 25, at 96 (interviewing an EPA official who reported that
“[i]t is very rare that EPA would nonacquiesce”); Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 59, at 717
(describing the EPA’s policy to accept adverse decisions in individual circuits and to refrain
from relitigating them).
83. See, e.g., Sally Katzen, Correspondence, A Reality Check on an Empirical Study:
Comments on “Inside the Administrative State,” 105 MICH. L. REV. 1497, 1505 (2007)
(observing how the EPA “focus[es] like a laser” on protecting the environment, whereas the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs takes “a broader view and consider[s] how, for
example, an environmental proposal will affect energy resources, tax revenues, health policy,
etc.”).
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2006) (making the D.C. Circuit the exclusive court with
jurisdiction to entertain challenges to the EPA’s air toxic rules, along with many other types
of challenges).
85. See, e.g., HUME, supra note 25, at 47 (discussing these virtues of the D.C. Circuit);
Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1004, 1041, 1070 (offering this hypothesis and
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toxic rules provides a good basis for testing the hypothesis that the
courts are critical to ensuring agency accountability, particularly
with regard to advancing the public interest in important and
complex agency rules. 
The air toxic emissions rules also provide a valuable set of rules
for study because the rules were promulgated by two different
presidential administrations—those of President Bill Clinton and
President George W. Bush.86 Although most of the litigation of the
EPA’s hazardous air pollutant (HAP) rules occurred during the
Bush administration, the majority of the air toxic rules appealed to
the courts were developed in principle by the EPA during the
Clinton administration.87 The data thus provide an opportunity for
comparing EPA interactions with the courts under different presi-
dential administrations. 
Although the air toxic emission standards potentially present a
best case for studying productive relations between agencies and
courts with regard to advancing the public interest, the HAPs rules
are also relatively typical examples of pollution control standards
and thus should extrapolate well to other rulemaking settings. Like
many of the EPA’s pollution control standards, the air toxic stan-
dards are mandated by statute and require the EPA to base
finding it to be true in their study of government-wide rulemakings during the 1980s).
86. See infra Appendix 1.
87. The crossover rules were developed as proposed rules and subjected to notice and
comment under President Clinton but were finalized under President Bush. See infra
Appendix 1. The features that triggered litigation were present in the original rule proposals
and thus are attributable primarily to the Clinton EPA. See, e.g., Mossville Envtl. Action Now
v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1232, 1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that the final rule questioned in the
action was promulgated in 2002); Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L. v. EPA, 323 F.3d 1088, 1089-91
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (describing the EPA’s 1996 rule, the petitioners’ requests for review and
reconsideration, the EPA’s 2001 denial of reconsideration, and the petitioners’ subsequent
request for review of this denial); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
for Polyvinyl Chloride and Copolymers Production, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,886, 45,886 (July 10, 2002)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (“The NESHAP for this source category were proposed on
December 8, 2000.”); see also Sierra Club v. EPA (Sierra Club I), 353 F.3d 976, 980-81 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (“In 1998, EPA announced proposed emission standards for primary copper smelter
and initiated notice-and-comment procedures.”); National Emission Standards for Hazardous
Air Pollutants for Primary Copper Smelting, 67 Fed. Reg. 40,478, 40,478 (July 12, 2002)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (“Today’s action constitutes final administrative action on the
proposed NESHAP for primary copper smelting.”). It remains possible, however, that based
on comments, the Clinton EPA might have withdrawn some of the litigated features at the
final rule stage.
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pollution control requirements on what it determines to be the best
available methods for limiting industrial emissions.88 Specifically,
section 112 of the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to identify
currently available or soon-to-be-available pollution-control tech-
nologies for each major class and category of industry and to select
the technology in each industrial category that best fulfills con-
gressional goals for vigorous but affordable pollution reductions.89
The EPA then converts the pollution reduction capabilities of the
selected technology to numerical emission limits or actual specified
technological fixes for each major industrial source of HAPs.90 For
example, one HAPs rule sets standards for air toxic emissions from
boat manufacturing;91 another rule sets emission standards for cel-
lulose product manufacturing;92 and another applies to coke ovens.93
Though the rules affect very different types of industries, they are
comparable insofar as each typically follows the same analytical
steps: defining the affected industry, setting standards for emissions
limitations, and establishing monitoring requirements.94 The EPA’s
promulgation of the rules is also constrained by statutory deadlines,
and these deadlines are often backed by lawsuits.95 
88. See Sierra Club I, 353 F.3d at 979-81.
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3) (requiring, for example, that emissions from existing plants
meet at least “the average emission limitation achieved by the best performing 12 percent of
the existing sources”).
90. See D. Bruce La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection
Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771, 809-11 (1977) (specifying three steps in setting technology-
based standards: (1) categorizing industries; (2) identifying the contents of their respective
wastewaters; and (3) identifying the range of control technologies available); see also Sanford
E. Gaines, Decisionmaking Procedures at the Environmental Protection Agency, 62 IOWA L.
REV. 839, 853 (1977) (discussing questions regarding the effectiveness of pollution control
technologies under various plant ages, sizes, and manufacturing conditions).
91. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/mactfnlalph.html (last updated Mar. 5,
2012) (providing the table of complete HAPs rules).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 63.5683 (2010) (describing the applicability of NESHAP rules that
govern boat manufacturing); id. § 63.5698 (providing emission limits for open molding resin
and gel coat operations in boat manufacturing); id. § 63.5725 (describing monitoring
requirements).
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e) (2006) (setting deadlines for rule promulgation); Wagner et al.,
supra note 9, at 125 (describing how more than 70% of these deadlines have been reinforced
by deadline suits that were subsequently settled with EPA).
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This Study focuses specifically on the air toxic rules that were
litigated to judgment and traces their life cycles from the initial
development of the proposed standard, to the final rule, and
ultimately to the fate of the rule after judicial review.96 Such a life
cycle view of the rules provides insights into agency-court inter-
actions at each critical stage of the administrative process.97 This
Study also places the litigated rules within the larger set of rules
from which they are drawn, which further illuminates important
features of agency-court-interest group interactions that have been
largely unexplored in the literature. For example, setting the
litigated rules against the larger set of rules from which they are
drawn provides a denominator for calculating the rate of litigation
of agency rulemakings.98 This Study also examines the litigated
rules with respect to their judicially identified defects and then
compares them with the larger set to determine whether the air
toxic standards that were reversed by the court are similar to the
larger set that were not challenged.99 
To gain insight into the black box of agency rulemaking, this
Study utilizes several different methods: quantitative methods, such
as coding rules and dockets to construct a larger quantitative data-
base; semi-quantitative methods, such as comparing court opinions;
and qualitative methods, such as conducting case studies and
interviewing stakeholders. Such an eclectic empirical approach
offers the most promising means of gathering information about a
process that has otherwise resisted empirical study.100 
96. See infra Part III.B.
97. Professors Schuck and Elliott conducted a comprehensive study that, among other
things, traced the fate of rules after remand across all agencies. See Schuck & Elliott, supra
note 85, at 1043-54. Except for their study and the reinforcing data provided by HUME, supra
note 25, at 70-91, and Jordan, supra note 76, at 416-39, there has been very little commentary
or empirical analysis of this important aspect of agency decision making. See also supra note
25 and accompanying text. How an agency responds to a court opinion tells, in theory, how
effective courts are in guiding the agencies. Understanding whether agencies ultimately
repair defective rules, as well as how they do so in light of the opinion, may provide useful
information regarding the impact of judicial review. 
98. See infra Part III.A.2.
99. See infra Part III.C.
100. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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III. FINDINGS
This Part presents findings that correspond to the questions
presented earlier. First and foremost, are the courts an important
force in advancing the public interest? Second, when the courts
intervene on behalf of the public interest, do the agencies respond
and respect their orders? And, finally, are there other costs to
judicial review that could ultimately impede the agency’s ability to
advance the public interest? 
As discussed in more detail below, the data reveal that the courts
encounter several significant obstacles in protecting the public
interest against industry capture. The first impediment is the
simple fact that the courts were summoned to oversee only a small
minority of the EPA’s HAPs rules, despite evidence that a larger
number of these rules might be candidates for successful challenge
by public interest groups.101 This limited role of the courts results in
large part from the scarce resources available to public interest
groups to participate, at least in comparison to their industry
counterparts.102 Even when the courts were involved in judicial
oversight of the HAPs rules, however, the courts’ remedial powers
were surprisingly limited. In several cases, reversals and remands
were effectively ignored by the EPA without consequence. Indeed,
the repromulgation by the EPA of vacated regulations has been the
exception rather than the rule.103
At the same time that the findings highlight the limitations of the
courts’ powers, the findings also underscore the value of this same
judicial oversight role to catch significant agency violations. Most of
the issues in the challenged HAPs rules were not factual dis-
agreements, but rather allegations that the EPA violated the terms
of its authorizing statute. The majority of these statutory challenges
were successful.104 Significant defects thus appear to afflict EPA’s
HAPs rules, at least for the rules challenged in court.
101. See infra Section III.A.2.
102. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
103. See infra Section III.B.
104. See infra Section III.B.2.
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Offsetting these limited but important benefits of judicial review
are possible countervailing costs to the rulemaking process. First
and foremost is the ability of stakeholders to leverage the threat of
judicial review against the agency in exchange for changes earlier
in the process. When confronted with the prospect of litigation,
agency staff eager to see a rule to completion may make a number
of concessions in the proposed and final rule in order to appease
vigorous participants. The resultant cumulative changes may lead
to a final rule that has been significantly altered in ways that dis-
proportionately advantage industry, at least in settings like the
HAPs rulemakings where the number of participants is skewed
heavily in favor of industry relative to public interest groups.105
In the case of EPA’s HAPs rules, then, the net ability of the courts
to advance the public interest is unclear. For every appeal of a HAPs
rule filed by a public interest group, there are ten other HAPs rules
that were not litigated, half of which were not even the subject of
comments by public interest groups. These other rules could be simi-
larly defective.106 Even more perversely, features that public interest
groups found objectionable in final HAPs rules could have orig-
inated from the EPA’s effort to compromise with industry in earlier
stages of the rulemaking specifically to stave off these industry
stakeholders’ potentially more numerous challenges.
A. The Role of the Courts in Advancing the Public Interest
Two primary sources of data shed light on the extent to which the
courts advance the public interest in the EPA’s air toxic rules: the
court opinions themselves and the larger set of rules from which the
litigated rules are drawn. Each is considered in turn.
1. The Court Opinions
Although only seven of the EPA’s HAPs rules were litigated to
judgment, these cases, when read end-to-end, offer powerful evi-
dence of how public interest groups are able to leverage the courts
to correct agency lapses in air toxic emissions standards. Of the
105. See infra notes 232-46 and accompanying text.
106. See infra Section III.A.2.
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seven cases, all but one was brought initially by an environmental
group.107 Even more notably, the environmentalists won all but one
of their challenges in the court of appeals.108 Despite its high loss
rate in the courts, the EPA did not file a petition for certiorari in the
Supreme Court in any of the cases.109 
The fact that environmental groups used the courts more
frequently than industry and generally succeeded in their appeals
underscores how judicial review can serve as an important insti-
tutional mechanism for advancing the public interest. Relative to
the few other measures of public interest litigation in the literature,
in fact, the air toxic rules may well represent a high water mark in
107. See infra Appendix 1.
108. See infra Appendix 1.
109. See infra Appendix 1. Professor Hume also finds a very low rate of petition filing
across all agencies in his empirical study of agencies’ responses to opinion writing. HUME,
supra note 25, at 49-50. Thus, the EPA’s willingness to allow the opinions to stand without
further review is not surprising when set across these larger agency statistics. 
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the public interest use110 and success111 of rule challenges in the
courts.112
110. Public interest group dominance of the appellate challenges to EPA rules may be
unusual, or at least may be a more recent phenomenon. Industry seemed to dominate the
challenges to the EPA’s earliest technology-based standards promulgated under the Clean
Water Act. See, e.g., George Cameron Coggins & Thomas O. McGarity, Judicial Review of
Technological Standards Under the Clean Water Act, 75 AICHE SYMPOSIUM SERIES:
WATER—1978, at 1, 9-10, 15-16 (1979) (detailing the industry’s “blunderbuss” attacks on
EPA’s first technology-based standards promulgated under the Clean Water Act); Lettie
McSpadden Wenner, The Reagan Era in Environmental Regulation, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION
AND PUBLIC POLICY 41, 48 (Miriam K. Mills ed., 1990) (reporting based on an empirical study
of appellate litigation from 1970 to 1985 that “[i]ndustry exceeded environmental groups’
complaints against government actions at the appellate level as early as 1976, and this was
reversed only once, in 1983, when industry’s inputs fell off”). A number of commenters also
predict and even assume that industry challenges to environmental rules will outnumber
public interest challenges, if for no other reason than that delayed rule promulgation brings
added benefits to industries who oppose pollution control standards. See, e.g., BRUCE M. OWEN
& RONALD BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME: STRATEGIC USE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS 4-5 (1978) (“The delay which can be purchased by litigation offers an opportunity to
undertake other measures to reduce or eliminate the costs of an eventual adverse decision.”);
Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-
Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729, 737-38 (same).
111. The literature identifies the EPA’s success rate, rather than that of individual sets of
petitioners. These studies of judicial review of EPA rulemaking report a slightly better EPA
success rate in the D.C. Circuit than found in this Study—33% to 41% as compared to 14%
in the HAPs rules. Professor Adler found that the EPA won only 33% of its sixty-nine cases
in the D.C. Circuit from 1993 to 2000, cases which primarily involved the challenge of a
rulemaking; the remaining cases were either lost or mixed in their results. See Jonathan H.
Adler, No Intelligible Principles: The EPA’s Record in Federal Court, REASON FOUNDATION 10-
11 (May 1, 2000), http://reason.org/files/3217ecd7bf37b4ea6aa81d4dc9f59a26.pdf. Professors
Schroeder and Glicksman found that the EPA’s rules were sustained in only 53% of the 111
cases from 1991 to 1999. See Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron,
State Farm, and EPA in the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,371,
10,374 (2001) (reporting a 53% success rate for the EPA, which they note is consistent with
other studies of all agency rulemaking appeals during a similar, albeit shorter, time period). 
The limited empirical studies available also suggest that the EPA fares worse in the HAPs
rules as compared with other agencies. In his study, Hume reports an affirmance rate by the
court of appeals of 48.5%, in the year 2000, for all agencies aggregated together, but only a
small portion, 7% of the remaining cases, involved reversals. See HUME, supra note 25, at 19.
Most of the rest were dismissals (27.3%) or “other” (17.2%). See id. Hume states that “[o]ver
the past half century, the likelihood of an affirmance has been at least forty percentage points
higher than the chance of reversal.” Id. By contrast, agency-wide, Schuck and Elliott found
a 76.6% success rate for all agencies in rulemaking challenges in 1984 to 1985, a rate that
increased from lower success rates in pre-Chevron periods, like 61% in 1975 and 55% in 1965.
See Schuck & Elliott, supra note 85, at 1007-08. Within their aggregated study, however,
when they examined public health agencies that conducted only rulemakings, the affirmances
dropped to about 40%, which is in line with the results found in this Study and the later
studies discussed above. Id. at 1021.
112. See infra Figure 1; see also infra Appendix 1 (providing supporting data).
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Figure 1: Fate of Litigated Cases in the EPA’s Air Toxic
Emission Rulemakings
It is not just the public interest groups’ dominance in using the
courts to check agency discretion in these HAPs rules that stands
out, but it is also the strength of their victories—both in numbers
and in the language of the courts’ opinions. In their challenges to
five of the rules—a sixth was remanded on other grounds—the
environmental groups raised twenty-three different legal claims,
and won on ten issues, or about 40%, of these challenges.113
Moreover, the bulk of the victories—eight issues—were challenges
to the agency’s interpretation of the statute—Chevron Step One
—rather than details concerning the EPA’s fact-finding or expla-
nation.114 This feature of their victories is important, as discussed
later, because it imposes increased legal constraints on the agency’s
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113. See infra Appendix 3; see also infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text. The court
vacated one rule because it was legally connected to a defective hazardous waste rule, and
thus this public interest group appeal drops out of much of the analysis presented in the
remainder of Part III of this Article. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1250,
1254 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
114. See infra Appendix 3; see also infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
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entire rulemaking project.115 Industry, by contrast, raised only four
issues in their three appeals, and two of the three appeals were
interventions in suits initiated by the public interest groups.116
Industry prevailed on two of these four issues, and both issues were
fact specific, Chevron Step Two challenges.117
Another telling aspect of the courts’ role in advancing the public
interest with respect to the air toxic rules is the tenor of the courts’
opinions, particularly in the last two major cases decided in 2007.
Both of the 2007 panels—each of which had two Republican
appointees and one Democratic appointee118—appeared not only
exasperated but alarmed at how the EPA’s deviations from the
statute and prior precedent systematically underprotected the
public health. For example, in Sierra Club II, the court reprimanded
the EPA for focusing too narrowly on the capabilities of existing
pollution control devices rather than on larger process and input
controls used by industry to reduce air toxic emissions: “EPA’s
rationales ... amount to nothing more than a concern about ensuring
that its floor is achievable by all kilns in the subcategory—precisely
the position we rejected in Cement Kiln.”119 This judicial frustration
with the EPA’s legally indefensible, industry-leaning interpretation
of its mandate runs through both 2007 opinions, which hold in favor
of the public interest groups on all seven points the groups raised in
challenging two sets of air toxic emission rules.120
The possibility that the courts provide an important institutional
check on defective, industry-captured rules is strongly supported
by these cases.121 To gain still better purchase on the capabilities
of the courts to advance the public interest, however, this Study also
115. See infra Part III.B.2.
116. See infra Appendix 3.
117. See infra Appendix 3.
118. In Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, the panel was composed of Circuit Judge
Thomas Beall Griffith and Chief Judge Douglas Howard Ginsburg—both Republican
appointees—and Circuit Judge Judith Ann Wilson Rogers—a Democratic appointee. In Sierra
Club v. EPA (Sierra Club II), 479 F.3d 875, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2007), the panel was composed of
Chief Judge Douglas Howard Ginsburg and Senior Circuit Judge Stephen Fain Williams—
both Republican appointees—and Circuit Judge David S. Tatel—a Democratic appointee.
119. 479 F.3d at 881.
120. See infra notes 182-87; see also infra Appendix 3 (listing in more detail the issues that
were reversed and remanded to EPA in these two cases).
121. See infra Appendix 3.
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positions the litigated rules against the larger set from which they
are drawn. 
2. The Denominator Factor: Comparing the Appeals Against the
Larger Set of Air Toxic Emission Standards
The first finding reveals that public interest groups are clear
beneficiaries of judicial review,122 but the corollary proposition—
namely that the courts serve as a significant check on agency
policies that unreasonably undermine the public interest—does not
follow automatically. The power of the courts is in part a function of
the extent to which they are summoned to review rules. If courts are
rarely deployed to run interference on the EPA’s rulemakings, then
their influence as overseers is likely to be much less significant than
if they are frequent arbiters of disputes.
Because fewer than 8% of the air toxic rules were ultimately
litigated to judgment,123 this denominator is likely to be important
to assessing the significance of the courts as guardians of the public
interest. More than 90% of the eighty-three air toxic rules were
simply never reviewed by the courts. As an empirical matter, the
low rate of appeals is consistent with the low appeal rate found in
the empirical literature124 and further refutes the widespread, but
unsupported, assertions of very high rates—around 80%—of judicial
challenges to “significant” EPA rules that populated the literature
in the 1990s.125 
122. See supra Part III.A.1.
123. See supra text accompanying note 107 (noting that only seven HAPs were litigated).
124. See Schroeder & Glicksman, supra note 111, at 10,375 n.40 (finding 111 appeals of
rules that resulted in appellate opinions, or 3%, out of a total of 3553 rules promulgated by
the EPA during the 1990s). Professor Cary Coglianese found a higher rate of litigation for
economically significant rules promulgated by the EPA under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act from 1980-1991; roughly a third of these rules were litigated. Cary Coglianese,
Challenging the Rules: Litigation and Bargaining in the Administrative Process 95 (1994)
(unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with author). 
125. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal
Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 334 (1991) (“Both environmental
organizations and industry took advantage of the increased judicial access and together
challenged between 80 and 85 percent of EPA’s major decisions.”); see also KAY LEHMAN
SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 367 (1986)
(“[V]irtually every regulation issued by such agencies as the Environmental Protection Agency
and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration is challenged in court either by
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Yet if the public interest victories constitute only a small slice of
the larger rulemaking pie, it becomes important to determine
whether this low appeal rate occurs because the remaining,
approximately 90% of the rules are viewed as adequate from the
standpoint of public health protection or, alternatively, whether
appealed rules are low in number because of the scarce resources of
public interest groups. If the public interest groups appeal only the
rules they find problematic, then the system appears to be working
quite well in protecting public health. A low appeal rate suggests
that the EPA is generally doing a good job and that when the EPA
slips up, the public interest groups are on hand to appeal. Equally
impressive from the standpoint of this hypothesis, when the public
interest groups do appeal, they tend to prevail, reinforcing their
shrewd judgment on rule deficiencies. On the other hand, if the
public interest groups find themselves strapped for resources and
able to appeal only a small fraction of the rules that they would
challenge in an ideal world of infinite resources, then the low appeal
rate may instead be a worrisome sign that the judicial oversight
mechanism for ensuring agency accountability is sorely incomplete. 
The available evidence supports the more pessimistic view that
the low appeal rate reflects limited public interest resources rather
than a low number of rules that actually warrant challenge. In a
discussion with a public interest group attorney involved in the air
toxics litigation, the attorney cited the group’s scarce resources as
a decisive factor in the group’s decision to select only a handful of
rules to appeal in court and emphasized that the small number of
appealed rules most certainly should not be read to suggest the
group’s satisfaction with the remaining eighty-three emission
standards.126 In selecting the rules to litigate, moreover, the public
interest attorney conceded to using back-of-the-envelope assess-
ments of the precedential value of the appeal, the extent of health
environmental and consumer groups or by industry.”). Professor Coglianese traced the origins
of the Ruckelshaus statement that “[e]ighty percent of what the [EPA] does is finally decided
... in a negotiated or formal court decision,” Coglianese, supra note 124, at 90, and found that
it had no empirical support or data behind it, id. at 85-93 (quoting William D. Ruckelshaus,
Environmental Protection: A Brief History of the Environmental Movement in America and the
Implications Abroad, 15 ENVTL. L. 455, 463 (1985)).
126. See E-mail from anonymous public interest litigator involved in HAPs rulemakings
during the 1990s (Dec. 8, 2011, 17:08 EST) (on file with author).
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protection potentially gained, and the ease of filing and prevailing
in an appeal.127 These litigation-based assessments, the attorney
admitted, undoubtedly miss important rules worthy of challenge,
but the group found it had to triage its scarce resources.128
Public interest group challenges are further limited by the groups’
inability to comment on all of the EPA’s HAPs rules. Specifically,
public interest groups filed comments on less than half of the EPA’s
air toxic rules, even though all of the rules have relatively direct
implications for public health protection.129 Their selection strategy
for commenting follows the same back-of-the-envelope assessment
used for litigation.130 Yet if the public interest groups do not submit
comments on the majority of the rules, then they waive their right
to appeal those rules unless the agency is put on notice of the chal-
lenges in comments proffered by another party, such as a state.131
Indeed, in two of the seven litigated rules, the environmental
petitioners did fail to file comments on the challenged rule but
relied on comments filed by states to establish that the agency had
adequate notice of their concerns.132 While this strategy worked
most of the time,133 for two issues raised in these two cases, the
courts held that the state comments did not raise their concerns
with “reasonable specificity” to put the agency on notice about the
problem and that the public interest groups had waived the
challenges.134 Thus, even in the cases litigated to judgment,
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See infra Appendix 2; infra Figure 5 and accompanying text. The public interest
litigator interviewed for this Study, see supra note 126, indicated that the reason public
interest groups did not submit comments on all HAPs rules was because of scarce resources
and not because they viewed the rules as unimportant to public health protection or likely to
be satisfactory in substance to their public interest constituencies. 
130. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Marcia R. Gelpe, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons from
Environmental Cases, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 10-25 (1985) (outlining the rationale behind
the exhaustion requirement and arguing for the abolition of exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement). This requirement is also imposed by some statutes, including the Clean Air Act.
See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) (2006). 
132. See, e.g., Sierra Club I, 353 F.3d 976, 982 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (relying on state comments
for issues raised on appeal, all of which were rejected).
133. Out of eleven issues raised by environmental petitioners in Sierra Club I, only one was
rejected based on the environmental group’s failure to raise it during the comment process.
353 F.3d at 991.
134. In Mossville Environmental Action Now v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1232, 1238-39 (D.C. Cir.
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environmentalists waived some potentially meritorious challenges
because they failed to file comments, which in turn appears to be a
result of scarce resources. 
It also bears note that the litigated rules, as a group, are gen-
erally similar to the nonlitigated rules with respect to factors, such
as the extent of industry dominance during the rulemaking life cycle
and changes made to the final rule based on notice and comment,
that might be expected to predict public interest challenges.135 For
example, 85% of the changes made by the EPA to the proposed rules
weakened the rules. This is true in both the litigated rules and the
much larger set of rules that were not litigated by public interest
groups.136 The only aberration is the PET resin rule, for which
industry was the sole petitioner filing an appeal.137 Ironically, how-
ever, this rule involved considerably more industry participation
during the preproposal stage138 and more changes made to weaken
the rule139 than was the case for the larger set of ninety air toxics
rules. Despite industry’s effective monopolization of this particular
rulemaking process, relative to the larger set of rules, several in-
dustry members were sufficiently troubled by one feature of the rule
to file administrative petitions for reconsideration with the EPA and
ultimately pursue an appeal to judgment in the D.C. Circuit.140 
There is one bright spot in this otherwise dour assessment of the
extent to which courts are engaged in overseeing the bulk of the
EPA’s rules: the courts were much more involved in deadline suits,
which were filed for more than 70% of all of the air toxic rules and
resulted in consent decrees in all cases.141 The deadline suits
2004), two issues were raised and deemed waived because of the nonspecificity of the state
comments.
135. See infra Appendix 2. The litigated rules were promulgated across different
administrations in basically the same proportion as the larger set of ninety rules. See infra
Appendix 1. 
136. For every measure of interest group engagement and rule change, the mean for the
litigated rules is within one standard deviation of the mean for all ninety air toxic rules. See
infra Appendix 2.
137. See infra Appendix 1.
138. The PET resin rule involved 302 informal contacts versus a mean of 85 (SD=104) for
all 90 rules. See infra Appendix 2.
139. The PET resin rule involved 20 changes weakening the rule versus a mean of 10.5
(SD=8.5) for all 90 rules. See infra Appendix 2.
140. See Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L. v. EPA, 323 F.3d 1088, 1090-91 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
141. See Wagner et al., supra note 9, at 52.
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ensured that the standards would at least be promulgated in a
reasonable time frame, although the substance of the rules was not
under consideration. The much higher public interest litigation rate
in filing deadline suits—73% of rules—as compared to appealing
rules on the merits—7% of rules—is likely explained by the relative
ease with which the litigation can be brought: no substantive issues
or technical considerations need to be analyzed in order to assess
whether the EPA has a statutory deadline and is missing it.142
3. Summary
The findings spotlight the importance of the courts in advancing
the public interest, but they also raise questions about the com-
prehensiveness of this litigation in relation to the much larger set
of rules of which they are a part. When summoned, the courts exert
a powerful role as guardians of the public interest. However, the
courts are involved in overseeing the substance of less than 10% of
the EPA’s air toxic standards.143 More importantly, at least from the
standpoint of the public interest, the evidence suggests that the
litigated rules may only be the tip of the public interest litigation
iceberg within the EPA’s larger air toxics standard-setting project.
B. What Is the Impact of the Courts’ Rulings on the EPA’s      
Rulemaking Project?
Even though affected stakeholders may not be able to file appeals
on all air toxic rules that they find legally deficient, the courts exert
a radius of influence that goes well beyond the handful of litigated
cases that end in a judgment. Court opinions on agency rules offer
important directions for how the agency must interpret the author-
izing statute, find facts, and provide accessible public explanations
for its decisions.144 Indeed, the very genius of judicial review is that
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (2006). Deadline suits can be filed with almost no
investment of time or effort and almost always lead to success. The only facts in contention
are whether there was a statutory deadline for a rule and whether the agency missed that
deadline. See, e.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 999-1000 (5th
ed. 2006) (describing these features of deadline suits).
143. See supra text accompanying note 123.
144. See, e.g., Linda R. Hirshman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem of
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judicial precedent will permeate the entirety of the agency’s rule-
making project and impact all future decisions, thus exerting an
influence that goes well beyond the individual cases. 
After first exploring the more direct impacts of the courts’
remands on the EPA’s standard-setting activities, this Part then
considers the extent to which a few, strong court victories might
influence the larger set of air toxic rules.
1. Repairing Deficient Rules
The most direct and immediate benefit to winning a case in court
is that it will lead to changes in the rule. If environmentalists
convince a court that the EPA should promulgate emission limits for
mercury in its cement kiln rule, then on remand the EPA will make
this change and the air will be cleaner.145 If industry convinces the
court that the EPA’s monitoring requirements are excessively costly,
then on remand the EPA will develop monitoring requirements
that are less expensive.146 Although this impact of judicial review is
limited to the rule under challenge, the repair of deficient rules is
still a valuable and seemingly automatic effect of judicial review. 
This inevitable impact of the courts’ orders on agency rulemaking
is nevertheless absent from most of the litigated HAPs rules. Of all
of the appealed rules that ended in a remand—five out of six
rules—only one of the deficient rules has been repaired, and even
for this single rule, it took the EPA a decade to make the repairs.147
See Table 1.
Administrative Discretion, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 646, 666-68 (1988) (touting the value of courts
in keeping agencies operating within statutory limits); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Reform of
the American Administrative Process: The Contemporary Debate, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 385, 397-
402 (same); cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984) (“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction.”).
145. See, e.g., Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA (Nat’l Lime II), 233 F.3d 625, 634 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
146. See, e.g., Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L. v. EPA, 323 F.3d 1088, 1091-92 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
147. In the sixth rule, the court vacated several passages it deemed were in violation of the
statute and left the remainder of the rule intact. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d
1364, 1371-75 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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Table 1: The Fate of the EPA’s HAPs Rules on Remand
Case
Caption
Nat’l
Lime II
Arteva Mossville Sierra
Club II
Natural
Res. Def.
Council
Remedy Remand Stay Remand
and vacated
Remand
and
vacated
Remand
and
vacated
Date of
Remand/
Vacatur
2000 2003 2004 2007 2007
Final
Rule
Revision
2010148 No
projected
date for
proposed
revised
rule.149
Consent
decree
promises
final rule by
July 2011,
but
proposed
rule has
still not
been
published.150
No
projected
date for
proposed
revised
rule.151
Proposed
rule
issued in
June
2010.152
Time
Between
Remand
and Final
Rule
Revision 
10 years 7+ years
(pending)
6+ years
(pending)
3+ years
(pending)
3+ years
(pending)
148149150151152
148. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Portland
Cement Manufacturing Industry and Standards of Performance for Portland Cement Plants,
75 Fed. Reg. 54,970 (Sept. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63).
149. See, e.g., E-mail from Susan Stahle, Office of Gen. Counsel, EPA, to author (June 30,
2010, 12:09 EST) (on file with author).
150. See, e.g., E-mail from Jodi Howard, Envtl. Eng’r, EPA, to author (June 22, 2010, 12:58
EST) (on file with author); see also NESHAP: Polyvinyl Chloride and Copolymers Production,
Amendments, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eAgendaSimple Search (search for RIN 2060-AN33) (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
151. In Spring 2010, the EPA had no projected date for the revision of this rule. See
NESHAP: Brick and Structural Clay and Clay Ceramics, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY
AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaSimpleSearch (search for RIN 2060-AP69)
(last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
152. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Major Sources:
Industrial, Commercial, and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 75 Fed. Reg. 32,005
(proposed June 4, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).
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The failure of the EPA to repair remanded and vacated rules is in
theory a temporary phenomenon, but the pervasiveness of the EPA’s
noncompliance is significant enough to suggest real limits to the
courts’ oversight role of the EPA’s air toxics rules. Specifically, four
rules remanded by the courts in 2003, 2004, and 2007 are still
unrevised, and the EPA has not even issued a proposed rule for
three of them.153
Despite the public interest wins on paper, then, the public in-
terest victories remain largely symbolic in practice. Indeed, for the
few vacated standards, the public interest successes in court may
have unwittingly set air quality protections backward rather than
forward.154 For the remanded and unrevised rules, there are cur-
rently no federal standards in place limiting toxic emissions from
the covered industries. States may apply their own state-based
restrictions while these federal standards are being hammered
out,155 but this is presumably not the result that public interest
groups had hoped for in challenging these rules. Ironically and in
contrast, in its one solitary appeal in Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L. v.
EPA, industry actually enjoyed a double victory as a result of the
EPA’s dilatory reparation efforts.156 Not only did the court remand
the rule to the EPA, but it stayed the standard as applied to the
petitioners’ facilities.157 Arteva’s industry appellants have thus
operated free of federal air toxic standards since 2003, with no sign
of a proposed revised rule on the horizon.
The EPA’s protracted delays in repairing rules on remand may
not be unusual. In their study of the effect of remand on agency
rules, Professors Schuck and Elliott identified potentially significant
delays in repairing rules across all of the agencies; five years after
the courts’ opinions, about 10% of the remanded rules had not been
addressed by the agencies.158 In his analysis of agency responses to
153. See supra Table 1.
154. The court vacated the EPA’s air toxic standards in Mossville, 370 F.3d 1232, 1234
(D.C. Cir. 2004); Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d 875, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2007); and Natural Resources
Defense Council, 489 F.3d 1364, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 2007), leaving no federal standard in place
while the agency repaired the defective standard. 
155. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(j) (2006) (requiring sources to obtain a permit that incorporates
individualized emission limits in situations where no limits have been promulgated).
156. 323 F.3d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
157. Id. at 1092.
158. See, e.g., Schuck & Elliott, supra note 85, at 1050.
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remands government-wide, Professor Hume also found a tendency
by agencies to delay implementation of court-imposed repairs,
particularly those that the agencies found disagreeable.159 Finally,
in her recent study of serial litigation in the courts’ review of
rulemakings, Professor Emily Meazell notes how many remands
“fizzle into nothingness” with regard to the agency’s ultimate
response.160
The reasons for the EPA’s dismal track record in repairing rules
are likely complex and variable, even within the small group of
remanded rules that are the subject of this Study. A number of
administrative law scholars have suggested that judicial review is
too abstracted and legalized and may demand the impossible from
agencies on remand.161 The cement kiln rule provides a possible
illustration of this phenomenon. In the cement kiln rule, the EPA
worked tirelessly to repair the rule on remand, but it faced
opposition from virtually every affected party at each stage of the
revision process. Figure 2 provides an illustration. EPA’s revised
proposal, which was published five years after the court’s remand,
attracted more than 1700 comments.162 After withdrawing its re-
vised final rule because of litigation threats—three petitions were
filed against the revised rule163—the EPA published a second
revised proposal in May 2009, which was more than 50 pages long
and triggered another 3000 comments.164 The EPA promulgated a
159. See, e.g., HUME, supra note 25, at 77 (“[A]dministrators ... confess to limiting the
effects of adverse decisions.... [by] decid[ing] to delay implementation for as long as possible.”).
160. Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 1722, 1781 (2011).
161. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 25, at 1321-22 (expressing this general concern); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Bureaucracy, Democracy and Judicial Review: The Uneasy Coexistence of Legal,
Managerial and Political Accountability 8 (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 194, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=1431601 (“When courts find that officials have misunderstood or misapplied
their mandates they substitute judicial judgment for the judgment of administrators who have
more direct connection to the democratic political process than judges have. Judicial review
can undermine the bureaucracy’s political accountability rather than reinforcing it.”).
162. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Portland Cement
Manufacturing Industry and Standards of Performance for Portland Cement Plants, 75 Fed.
Reg. 54,970, 54,972 (Sept. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63).
163. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Portland Cement
Manufacturing Industry, 74 Fed. Reg. 21,136, 21,139 (May 6, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 60, 63).
164. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Portland Cement
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second revised final rule in September 2010165 and has already
received a petition for reconsideration and published a proposal for
amendments.166 Finalization of this ten-year revision effort does not
appear imminent.
Figure 2: EPA’s Federal Register Activity Dedicated to
Repairing the Remanded Cement Kiln Rule
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3 Petitions for 
reconsideration by 
industry & public 
interest 
2005 
  Settlement with    
public interest groups  
for expeditious rule  
promulgation 
Final 
Rule 
National 
Lime 
remand 
Proposed rule 
(again) with 
amendments   
Proposed 
revised rule 
with 
amendments 
Final rule 
amendments 
Final rule 
(again) with 
amendments 
Petitions granted and 
most of revised rule 
withdrawn 
Manufacturing Industry and Standards of Performance for Portland Cement Plants, 75 Fed.
Reg. at 54,972.
165. Id. at 54,970.
166. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Portland
Cement Manufacturing Industry and Standards of Performance for Portland Cement Plants,
76 Fed. Reg. 2860 (Jan. 18, 2011). EPA has also received a petition for reconsideration from
NRDC regarding the allowance of an affirmative defense for malfunctions. See Petition for
Reconsideration No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2007-0877-0110, available at http://www.regulations.gov.
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Other remanded HAPs rules have received less attention from
the EPA, and the agency’s delays in repairing these rules seem to be
the result of simple inaction.167 There are a number of possible
explanations for this inaction. For all of the remanded rules, George
W. Bush was the Chief Executive at the time,168 and diverting
agency resources to repair rules may not have been a priority of his
administration, particularly when the resulting delays uniformly
benefit industry.169 The EPA may also lack the resources to devote
to the reparation of rules when it already faces a backlog of air toxic
standards that are behind schedule.170 Indeed, because none of the
remands and vacaturs, save possibly one, involves a legal obligation
to promulgate the revised standard by a certain date, the EPA may
have been first devoting its efforts to promulgating standards with
legally enforceable deadlines.171 Public interest groups may even
167. Mossville Environmental Action Now v. EPA, decided in 2004, involved vacatur of a
rule on appeal by environmental petitioners, and the EPA is only now engaging in the
proposed-rule process that is governed by a subsequent consent decree with petitioners. See
370 F.3d 1232, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2004); supra note 112 and accompanying text. According to the
rule docket, virtually no activity occurred with respect to repairing this rule over a nearly
nine-year span, from 2002 to 2011. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DOCKET NO. EPA-HQ-
OAR-2002-0037, NATIONAL EMISSIONS STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS FOR
POLYVINYL CHLORIDE AND COPOLYMERS PRODUCTION, available at http://www.regulations.gov.
The EPA’s semiannual agenda similarly reveals that the agency continues to roll back the
projected timeline for the proposed rule. See supra Table 1. The EPA also appears to have
made only limited progress in responding to the stay of the PET resin rule with respect to
petitioners as a result of Arteva Specialities S.A.R.L. v. EPA, 323 F.3d 1088, 1092 (D.C. Cir.
2003). The EPA’s docket lists only two documents logged in after 2001: the final rule was
promulgated in 2001 and stayed in 2003. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DOCKET NO. EPA-
HQ-OAR-2001-0005, NESHAP POLYMERS AND RESINS IV, available at http://www.
regulations.gov. Both documents in the PET docket are efforts by the EPA to develop more
information on the cost-effectiveness of the monitoring requirements for subsets of industries,
which was the issue remanded by the court.
168. See infra Appendix 1.
169. See, e.g., Schuck & Elliott, supra note 85, at 1052 (suggesting that certain events may
occur after remand that explain agency inaction or resistance, including “changes in
presidential or agency leadership”).
170. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing statutory deadlines reinforced
by judicial decrees for the majority of air toxic rules).
171. The possibility that the EPA has limited resources and staff to devote to air toxic rules
and prioritizes the new rules that are enforced by statutory and judicial deadlines, rather
than the remanded rules, is further supported by the aberrational nature of the EPA’s
inaction in repairing air toxic rules as compared with other EPA rulemakings. In a 1989
article, Rosemary O’Leary discovered that the EPA places a high priority on repairing
remanded rules. Rosemary O’Leary, The Impact of Federal Court Decisions on the Policies and
Administration of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 549, 561-62
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support this prioritization because it maximizes the number of
standards in effect. 
In any event and whatever the explanation for the EPA’s delays
in repairing the remanded rules, from the standpoint of the courts’
role in advancing the public interest, the findings are disappointing.
Strong opinions and remands do not lead to repaired rules within a
reasonable timeframe, and the public health and environment may
be poorly protected in the interim.172 
2. Precedential Effects
Fortunately, the EPA’s inability to repair the remanded rules
does not affect the larger precedential impact of the court opinions.
The “rule of law” limits that the courts place on agency discretion
are arguably the single most significant impact that courts have on
agency rulemakings.173 Judicial review also reminds the agency that
there is an institution that can intervene to review its decisions.
Precedent thus guides future rulemaking decisions in ways that
transcend the results in individual rulemaking projects.
From a systemic level, then, judicial review offers agencies direc-
tives on many rules. It constrains how the statute can be applied
and interpreted across the entire rulemaking project. This sub-
stantive influence is particularly evident in the courts’ opinions
governing the air toxic rules.174 A coding of each of the litigated
(1989). Yet O’Leary did not discriminate between remands that were accompanied by
deadlines or consent decrees and those that were not. In the latter case, the agency may
actually put rule reparations as a lower priority when there are more pressing legal
obligations to promulgate new rules on a tight schedule.
172. Although public interest groups have requested the courts not to vacate rules that are
remanded, see, e.g., Nat’l Lime II, 233 F.3d 625, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (recounting public
interest request to that effect), the D.C. Circuit seems to take an ad hoc approach to remedy
choices in its remand of rulemakings. In a concurrence in a related case, in fact, Judge
Randolph bemoaned the court’s inattention to remedies and the problematic features of
vacaturs for complex rulemakings when far superior remedial approaches, such as time-
limited stays, allow the courts to ensure that the remedial work on the rule is not only
completed, but is completed properly. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1250,
1262-64 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Randolph, J., concurring). 
173. See generally supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
174. Because this Article’s hypothesis is concerned with ways that courts impact agencies,
the cases where the courts reinforced the appropriateness of the EPA’s decisions are not
considered in detail. This data is nevertheless collected in the larger table from which Figure
2012] AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 1757
issues in all of the cases reveals that two-thirds of the issues
remanded by the courts involved issues of statutory interpretation
at the Chevron Step One stage.175 In fact, these statutory differences
between the EPA and the courts on substantive matters of statutory
interpretation became more, not less, frequent over time. By con-
trast, fact- or record-based challenges occurred in only four of the
remands, and two of the issues were raised by public interest
groups. One other empirical study also found a greater occurrence
of Step One-based remands relative to Step Two-based remands, at
least for the EPA’s rule challenges in the court of appeals.176
2 is drawn. See infra Appendix 3.
175. See infra Figure 3. An issue was identified as Chevron Step One if the court found that
the agency’s rule violated the clear terms of the statute. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (stating that Congress “has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue” and the agency chose the wrong answer). Coding of the individual
issues in each case is provided in Appendix 3; the page number assigned to each issue is
provided for easy verification. All coding was conducted by the author.
176. Once the agency gets past Step One, which it did in only 41% of the cases, see infra
Figure 3, it faces very high odds—in the Shroeder & Glicksman study, a 92% chance—of being
upheld during Step Two when the court considers only whether the agency’s interpretation
was “permissible” or “reasonable” in light of the statute. Schroeder & Glicksman, supra note
111, at 10,376-77; cf. HUME, supra note 25, at 21-22 (reporting that most of the agency losses
in the courts of appeals are for failing to provide adequate justification and that only a few
cases involve substantive grounds for reversal, such as a flawed interpretation of the statute). 
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Figure 3: Number of Issues Won or Lost on Chevron Step One
or Step Two in the EPA’s Litigated HAPs Rules
Consistent with the Step One basis for most of the court remands,
the emergent case law sets some “rule of law” limits on how the EPA
can interpret and apply a statute in the course of its rulemakings.
Although there was slight ambiguity on a few issues,177 the courts’
rulings, particularly on several repeat issues, left little room for the
EPA to argue that the holdings are unclear.178
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177. See infra notes 200-05 and accompanying text (discussing wiggle room).
178. See Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d 875, 876, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Natural Res. Def. Council
v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1364, 1369, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also HUME, supra note 25, at 39-40
(discussing the use of strongly worded judicial reprimands to catch the agency’s attention and
limit its discretion in interpreting an opinion).
2012] AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 1759
Text Box 1: “Rule of Law” Constraints Imposed on the EPA’s
HAPs Emission Standards by the Case Law 
1.  “No control” standard for individual hazardous substances is not an
option under the statute; the EPA must set emission limits for all
HAPs. Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d at 883; National Lime II, 233 F.3d at
634; see also Final Rule for Portland Cement Kilns, 75 Fed. Reg. at
54,970, 54,973 (Sept. 9, 2010) (confirming these constraints).
2. EPA must measure “actual emissions” from best performers to set
emission standards. Achievability—that is, whether all firms can meet
those limits—is not a consideration under the terms of the statute.
Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d at 880; see also 75 Fed. Reg. at 54,973.
3. Variability cannot be benchmarked against the low performers to
determine industry capabilities. Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d at 882; see
also 75 Fed. Reg. at 54,973.
4. Compliance extensions cannot be granted by the EPA outside of
statutory deadlines. Natural Res. Def. Council, 489 F.3d at 1373.
5. EPA cannot create a low-risk exemption for major sources under
Section 112. Id. at 1371.
6. Nontechnological mechanisms for control need to be included in the
EPA’s analysis of firms’ capabilities for emissions reductions. The EPA
cannot consider only technological mechanisms of control and ignore
other methods of limiting HAPs emissions, such as changing inputs.
Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d at 883; see also 75 Fed. Reg. at 54,973.
7. EPA cannot substitute work practice standards for emission
standards without satisfying the statutory criteria. Sierra Club II, 479
F.3d at 884.
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However, even this strong body of precedent appears, in practice,
to exert less influence on the EPA’s rules than one might expect.
First and most striking is the fact that the EPA largely ignored or,
when that failed, aggressively distinguished precedent that imposed
more stringent standards on industry. The EPA’s effort to either
ignore or distinguish away these judicial interpretations is evi-
denced in four of the five issues that the EPA lost179 when it
litigated its brick kiln rule in 2007.180 This is also seen in at least
one, if not all three, of the issues that the EPA lost when it defended
the plywood rule in 2007.181 The 2007 panel presiding over the
challenge to the brick kiln rule seemed nonplussed by the EPA’s
nonacquiescence: “Other than again claiming that it has no obli-
gation to set floors unless sources take some deliberate action to
control emissions, EPA has failed to offer any reason for dis-
tinguishing what it did here from what we invalidated in National
179. See, e.g., Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d at 880-81 (holding that the statute and D.C. Circuit
cases are clear that in setting floors, the EPA must base standards on what the best
performers actually achieve, rather than claiming that they must be set at a level that is
achievable by all sources; the EPA tried to circumvent these requirements by redefining “best
performing”); id. at 881-82 (holding that D.C. Circuit precedent made it clear that it was a
violation of the statute for the EPA to use worst-performing sources as measure of variability
in best-performing sources without at least a demonstrated relationship between the two; the
EPA insisted that natural variability allowed it to do this); id. at 882-83 (holding that the EPA
must consider nontechnology factors if they are present; the EPA argued for consideration of
deliberate steps only).
180. See id. at 883 (noting that only one of the five issues on appeal is not controlled by
either Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA (Cement Kiln), 255 F.3d 855 (D.C. Cir. 2001),
or National Lime II)
181. See infra notes 190-92 and accompanying text. Even though the court chastised the
agency in its 2000 National Lime II decision for adopting “no controls” for specific toxic
chemicals for which the best performing industry had not demonstrated technological
processes for limiting emissions, Nat’l Lime II, 233 F.3d 625, 633-34 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the EPA
did precisely this same thing again in both the brick kiln and plywood rules, see, e.g., Sierra
Club II, 479 F.3d at 883; Natural Res. Def. Council, 489 F.3d at 1371. The EPA’s inability to
credibly make arguments in its defense led it to agree to withdraw that portion of the plywood
rule that adopted a “no control” floor without requiring the court to rule on the issue. Id. The
EPA requested a remand of its rule following Sierra Club II to the extent that the EPA had
failed to establish emission standards for listed HAPs. The other two issues on which the
EPA’s rule failed at Step One—its risk-based exception and its effort to provide extensions on
the statute’s compliance scheme in ways that had no statutory justifications —appear
sufficiently out of line with the clear terms of the statute that one wonders whether they were
the product of higher-level political decision making. See infra note 197 and accompanying
text. 
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Lime II.”182 Yet, even after the courts’ repeat admonishments, the
EPA still may be considering ways to sidestep precedent through
creative interpretations, such as further subdividing industry
groups in ways that impose fewer controls on certain subsets of
industry.183 Thus, although some of the courts’ holdings do seem to
impose hard legal constraints on the EPA, the agency in at least
some cases seems to minimize the impact of precedent on its
preferred course of action.184 
The EPA’s occasional irreverence toward precedent does not
appear to be unique to the air toxic rules.185 In other regulatory set-
tings, agencies have explicitly nonacquiesced to binding precedent,
182. Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d at 883.
183. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Portland
Cement Manufacturing Industry, 74 Fed. Reg. 21,136, 21,140, 21,144, 21,148 (proposed May
6, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63) (discussing the permissibility and advantages
of subcategorizing industries to provide for higher emission standards for some groups of
industry and avoid shutdowns that might otherwise result from a single emission standard,
and citing Judge Williams’s concurrence as endorsement of this approach); see also U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DOCKET NO. EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-0051-2102, IMPLICATIONS OF THE
BRICK MACT DECISION ON EPA’S DISCRETION IN SETTING MACT FLOORS 1, 15, 29 (Jan. 25,
2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-0051-
2102 (identifying the flexibility remaining after the Brick MACT decision, particularly with
regard to accounting for variability among firms in setting emission standards). This move
may be further emboldened by Judge Williams in his concurrence in Sierra Club II. 479 F.3d
at 885 (Williams, J., concurring) (“[Although] authority to generate subcategories is obviously
not unqualified .... [O]ne legitimate basis for creating additional subcategories must be the
interest in keeping the relation between ‘achieved’ and ‘achievable’ in accord with common
sense and the reasonable meaning of the statute.”).
184. Another interesting question that this Study does not explore is why the EPA seems
inclined to promulgate industry-leaning rules in these cases. There are many possible answers
that, again, likely vary among rules and presidential administrations. One possibility is that
some of the courts’ demands that require more stringent emission standards may prove so
costly that the EPA is concerned about a litigation backlash from industry on multiple
subissues associated with those more stringent standards. Thus the EPA may be trading a
litigation loss to public interest groups against litigation losses to industry. Given the
evidence on the engagement and resources of these two groups, the EPA may generally find
it more cost effective to assume that industry will sue, and, as a result, it leans in their
direction even when the case law seems to suggest differently. Cf. HUME, supra note 25, at 73
(reporting on how agency officials comply with court rulings to avoid future litigation, which
in turn assumes that the successful group in the first case will likely be a repeat player in
subsequent rules).
185. The view that the courts would not be able to control agency discretion is one that has
been held for a number of decades. See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE
27-28, 215-16 (1971); MARTIN SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
265 (1968).
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although this occurs most often in circuit splits.186 In these cases,
agencies take litigation risks to advance their preferred policies.187
Moreover, although nonacquiescence tends to be discussed in the
literature as a problem that needs to be fixed,188 it may simply be an
institutional fact of life that suggests that the courts’ role is often
secondary to political considerations and that this subsidiary role
will be difficult to alter.189 
Even more telling in assessing the impact of adverse court
opinions on the EPA’s behavior is evidence of explicit legal risk
taking by the EPA. In its plywood and composite rules, for example,
the EPA seemed to fully appreciate that a particularly novel inter-
pretation of the statute—creating a low-risk exemption for major
sources190—was legally vulnerable under the plain language of the
statute but concluded it was worth the risk given the extralegal
gains, such as political and economic benefits, if the approach sur-
vived in final form.191 The court unanimously held that the
186. See HUME, supra note 25, at 92 (“Nonacquiescence occurs when an agency applies a
court decision only to the parties who participated in the original litigation, refusing to treat
the case as binding precedent in subsequent proceedings.”); id. at 77-78 (discussing how
agencies interpret unwelcome judicial opinions as narrowly as possible and sometimes view
a court opinion as just part of an ongoing dialogue); Meazell, supra note 160, at 1782-83
(discussing cases in which the agency effectively ignored the courts’ adverse rulings).
187. See, e.g., DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 61, at 2250-51 (describing how “judicial
review is ... an imperfect oversight tool” given the ability of an agency to ignore or distinguish
precedent that is in conflict with its policy or related objectives); see also Frederick Schauer,
When and How (If at All) Does Law Constrain Official Action?, 44 GA. L. REV. 769, 770, 786-
88, 797-801 (2010) (modeling some of the variables that affect and constrain official action and
discussing the limited impediments imposed by the law in many circumstances).
188. See, e.g., Modesitt, supra note 59, at 953; see also Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz,
Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher
and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801, 803 (1990).
189. See, e.g., DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 61, at 2250-51 (concluding that courts enjoy
only limited control over agencies).
190. See Final Rule on National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants:
Plywood Industry and Composite Wood Products, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,946, 45,953-54 (July 30,
2004) (construing section 122(c)(9) of the Clean Air Act as allowing the agency to remove
subcategories of HAP sources from the list of sources subject to MACT standards). Although
section 122(c)(9)(B) only refers to the ability to delete “any source category from the list” if it
meets certain criteria, the EPA relied on the mention of the word “subcategories” in section
122(c)(9)(B)(ii) in its interpretation of the CAA. Id. at 45,946.
191. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DOCKET NO. EPA-HQ-OAR-2003-0048-0201, RISK IN
MACT: BRIEFING FOR ACTING ADMINISTRATOR MARIANNE L. HORINKO (Oct. 6, 2003), available
at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2003-0048-0201; U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DOCKET NO. EPA-HQ-OAR-2003-0048-0208, SETTING HAZARD INDEX
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exemption was “plainly prohibited”: “Whatever factors EPA might
properly consider for subcategorization, it has no authority to create
a low-risk subcategory scheme that allows harmful emissions in a
manner contrary to Congress’s statutory scheme.”192 Yet the
possibility of judicial reversal did not deter the EPA from engaging
in this legally risky experiment.193
In their study of the judicial review of EPA rules during the
1990’s, Professors Glicksman and Schroeder similarly identified
several legally tenuous rules that the EPA promulgated in order to
advance certain policy preferences.194 They concluded that the “EPA
may have incentives to proceed with some interpretations of
statutes even when it believes them to be erroneous. A particular
interpretation may be necessary to satisfy an important constit-
uency, for example.”195 
The limited role of the courts in affecting the agency’s decision-
making process makes sense, in fact, when viewed from a broader,
institutional vantage point.196 Agencies have several masters, and
the courts may be less threatening than other sources of pressure.197
Even when an agency receives clear directions from the court, it
LIMITS-BRIEFING FOR DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR JOHNSON, available at http://www.regulations.
gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2003-0048-0208; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DOCKET
NO. EPA-HQ-OAR-2003-0048-0207, PLYWOOD AND COMPOSITE WOOD PRODUCTS MACT AND
TURBINES MACT: USING RISK TO DELIST CERTAIN SUBCATEGORIES - BRIEFING FOR
ADMINISTRATOR LEVITT (Jan. 5, 2004), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!document
Detail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2003-0048-0207.
192. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1364, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
193. Id.
194. Schroeder & Glicksman, supra note 111, at 10,387 (discussing rules for which the
“EPA had strong policy preferences that it chose to pursue even though the arguments that
its authorizing statute could be interpreted to allow that pursuit were extremely weak,” and
noting further that it seemed clear in these cases that the “EPA’s lawyers knew they were
advancing weak arguments”).
195. Id. at 10,377-78; see also id. at 10,379-83 (elaborating on some of these tensions
between agency policies and statutory directions using individual cases).
196. The ideology of the agency or even the appointees themselves seems an important
determinant in the agency’s receptivity to court rulings. See, e.g., HUME, supra note 25, at 87
(reporting that the “more strongly the FCC and FERC disagree with case outcomes ..., the less
likely they are to change their policies”).
197. See, e.g., id. at 74 (quoting from interviews with agency officials who acknowledge the
influence that politics may have on agency rulemaking, even when it may leave the agency
vulnerable to appeal); Mashaw, supra note 161, at 19-20 (discussing the simultaneous and
sometimes conflicting accountability checks imposed at once by the courts and the President
on agencies).
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may not always comply with the court’s ruling when the prospect of
reversal is outweighed by other factors—like politics or ideology.
The legal malleability of most rulemakings, moreover, likely allows
a creative agency to identify at least some alternative paths around
problematic precedent.198 As Professor Mashaw has noted, it is
difficult to squeeze the discretion out of the agencies.199 
There are other, more mundane reasons why the impact of the
courts’ precedent may not always constrain the EPA’s discretion in
the air toxic rules. First, while some of the courts’ interpretations
are relatively unambiguous, other issues decided by the courts allow
more wiggle room for interpretation.200 For example, in Mossville
Environmental Action Now v. EPA, the court permitted the EPA to
consider the variability among all sources in setting emissions re-
ductions for PVC manufacturers,201 but when the EPA attempted to
rely on Mossville to make similar, variability-based estimates for
the brick kiln industry, the court vacated the rule because the EPA
failed to produce evidence showing that the variability of the worst-
performing sources was indicative of the variability of the best-
performing sources.202 The court’s elaboration in 2007 on the
198. Cf. id. at 10,377 (discussing how the EPA may choose to “eschew rulemaking” to avoid
statutory language that is clearly contrary to its desired action).
199. See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 154 (1997) (“Squeezing discretion out of a statutory-administrative
system is indeed so difficult that one is tempted to posit a ‘Law of Conservation of
Administrative Discretion.’”).
200. In promulgating the Portland Cement emission standard challenged in National Lime
II, the EPA also relied heavily on a 1999 opinion in justifying its decision, later vacated, to
base emission standards on technology achievable by the industry in the most adverse
circumstances and in setting “no control” standards for individual HAPs when the best
industry was not controlling emissions for these air toxics. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 167 F.3d
658 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Final Rule on National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants for Portland Cement Manufacturing Industry, 64 Fed. Reg. 31,910, 31,915 (June
14, 1999). The National Lime II court disagreed with the EPA’s 1999 interpretation of its
Sierra Club opinion. 233 F.3d 625, 629, 634-35 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
201. 370 F.3d 1232, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[E]ach [source] must meet the [specified]
standard every day and under all operating conditions.”). The court further agreed that in
that case the worst performing sources’ variability was indicative of the variability among
best-performing sources. Id.
202. Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d 875, 881-82 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[The EPA] has failed to show
[as it did in Mossville] that the emission levels achieved by the worst performers using a given
pollution control device actually predict the range of emission levels achieved by the best
performers using that device.”). 
2012] AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 1765
implicit requirements of its 2004 holding in Mossville is logical,203
yet the EPA’s alternate, more literal application of the 2004 holding
is also legally plausible. Thus, some of the EPA’s violations appear
traceable to credible legal differences in interpreting and applying
the courts’ precedent, rather than to nonacquiescence. Gaps and
ambiguities in the court opinions are particularly inevitable for a
complex standard-setting project like the air toxic rules.204 In fact,
the D.C. Circuit admitted that some of its holdings might be limited
to the unique details of the individual air toxic rules: 
This court has adopted an “every tub on its own bottom”
approach to EPA’s setting of standard pursuant to the CAA,
under which the adequacy of the underlying justification offered
by the agency is the pertinent factor—not what the agency did
on a different record concerning a different industry.205
Second, at least a few of the court opinions that remand the EPA’s
HAPs rules have limited precedential effect because they are fact
specific. The court’s decision in Arteva, reversing an air toxics rule
because of the EPA’s failure to document the reasonableness of a
mandatory monitoring requirement, offers virtually no guidelines
for other air toxic rules.206 Though most of the court rulings are not
this fact specific, when they are, the resulting decisions offer little
precedential guidance.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the court’s strongest and
most thorough opinions were issued in 2007,207 after about 90% of
the air toxic standards had already been promulgated as final and
the opportunity for appealing them had passed.208 Thus, the bulk of
the court’s most important rulings in terms of the statutory inter-
pretation of section 112 of the Clean Air Act were published at a
203. The 2004 Mossville opinion discusses the EPA’s factual support for its approach to
estimating variability. 370 F.3d at 1242. Yet in this portion of the opinion, the court does not
explicitly define the factual predicates that apply to extrapolation from limited data regarding
variability, thus leaving room for ambiguous and varying interpretations of the ruling. Id.
204. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 25, at 1278-81 (predicting that this inevitability would be
one of the many drawbacks of judicial review).
205. Sierra Club I, 353 F.3d 976, 986 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
206. Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L. v. EPA, 323 F.3d 1088, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
207. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1364, 1367-68 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Sierra
Club II, 479 F.3d at 884.
208. See infra Appendix 3.
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point in time when their influence was, in practice, necessarily
limited.209 
Viewed skeptically, court precedent in the air toxic rules may
thus place only a few limited constraints on the EPA’s interpre-
tation of the statute in setting air toxic emission standards, and by
no means does this body of cases serve as an insurmountable barrier
to the EPA persevering with its preferred policy on a number of
issues. Yet if the courts face practical impediments in their ability
to advance the public interest when they conclude that an agency’s
interpretation is not in keeping with the statute, then it is worth
investigating whether there are also downsides associated with
judicial review that may inadvertently undermine public interest
protections. 
C. Some of the Unintended Costs to the Public Interest from
Judicial Review
It is well known that judicial review may affect agency rule-
makings in unintended ways that ultimately impair the courts’ and
even the agency’s ability to advance the public interest.210 These
costs, when added to the more limited gains, could mean that the
courts’ net effect on advancement of the public interest is negative
rather than positive. To simplify the identification of these unin-
tended side effects, the courts’ opinions are assumed to be beyond
reproach as a legal and policy matter, thus removing at least one
possible complication from consideration.211 Ossification is also
not tested in these rules because, as mentioned, all the rules are
209. The court issued one important decision regarding statutory interpretation in 2000
in National Lime II, after more than one-third of the rules had been promulgated. 233 F.3d
625, 634 (D.C. Cir. 2000). This decision held the EPA’s interpretation of the statute as
allowing “no control” of some HAPs was invalid. Id. at 633. The court’s ruling should have in
theory constrained the agency in setting the remaining standards, but as discussed above, the
agency seemed to consciously ignore the court’s ruling and was held in violation of that same
issue in two subsequent remands in 2007. See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
With the exception of this one issue decided in 2000, there were no opinions that remanded
the EPA’s standard-setting based on flawed statutory interpretation until 2007, after 90% of
the standards were promulgated as final. See infra Appendix 3. 
210. See Cross, supra note 25, at 1311 (noting that judicial review tends to encourage
adversarial and dishonest dealings that adversely affect the rulemaking process).
211. For a discussion of some of the possible flaws in the court’s opinions themselves, see
generally MELNICK, supra note 74.
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promulgated under statutory deadlines and the vast majority of
these deadlines are backed by judicial decrees.212
Despite the significant narrowing of the possible unintended side
effects arising from judicial review, at least three types of costs in
the air toxic rules may undermine the ability of the courts to ad-
vance the public interest. The first and most obvious cost results
from the delay associated with a court challenge.213 With respect to
reaching a final judgment, each of the judicial challenges of the
seven rules added two years, on average, to the rulemaking pro-
cess.214 Additional delays occurred in the EPA’s repair of remanded
rules, in some cases leaving no federal standards in place for years
while the details of these revised rules are being worked out.215 Such
litigation-related delays benefit industry at the expense of the public
interest, at least in protective standard setting. Indeed, this
lopsided feature of litigation may be used strategically by regulated
parties to gain additional concessions from the agency.216 
212. See McGarity, supra note 46 at 1385-86 (describing ossification); supra note 95 and
accompanying text.
213. See Cross, supra note 25, at 1313-14 (expressing concern that the diversion of
resources to respond to and defend against litigation may not be justified by the benefits that
judicial review adds to the process).
214. See infra Appendix 1.
215. See supra Part III.B.1.
216. For example, Professors Owen and Braeutigam suggest in their “Strategies for
Established Firms and Industries” ways to game the EPA:
The delay which can be purchased by litigation offers an opportunity to
undertake other measures to reduce or eliminate the costs of an eventual
adverse decision. These measures include strategic innovation, legislative
proposals, and lobbying activity. If the administrative process goes on long
enough, it is even possible to ask for a new hearing on the grounds that new and
more accurate information may be available. The agency usually cannot resist
the effort to delay through exhaustion of process because this would be grounds
for reversal on appeal to the courts.
OWEN & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 110, at 4-5. By contrast, environmental groups often see
delay as a window during which health is not sufficiently protected. See, e.g., RONALD J.
HREBENAR, INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN AMERICA 262 (3d ed. 1997) (observing that “[t]ime
delays often benefit the corporate interests while creating a disadvantage for consumer
groups” and linking this not only to regulatory consequences but also to the costs of engaging
in the process). Though the EPA’s standards may be a disappointment, further delaying their
implementation could be worse. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 1, at 1772 (“Increased
procedural formalities [like judicial review] may work to the disadvantage of public interest
groups by exhausting their limited resources and providing organized interests a basis for
delaying agency enforcement actions.”); cf. MASHAW, supra note 199, at 174 (noting that the
timing of review and associated compliance costs affect a party’s stake in challenging a rule
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A second, related cost arising from judicial review involves
substantive and resource drains associated with the agency’s
negotiation of rulemaking petitions. Rulemaking settlements are
reached after a final rule is promulgated, but before an appeal to the
court, in order to limit the risks of a remand and minimize the
delays and related agency drains associated with judicial review.217
While agency resources dedicated to rulemaking settlements are
likely to be less taxing administratively than revising rules on
remand, these settlements still appear to demand considerable
agency resources in some cases.218 
The cement kiln rule provides an illustration of these resource
drains. After the final rule was promulgated in 1999, a group of
industries threatened to raise a separate set of challenges against
the rule in the D.C. Circuit.219 The EPA ultimately settled this batch
of industry claims, which involved twenty-four discrete changes
to the rule, but the settlement was neither simple nor quick.220
Similarly, in an unrelated rule governing PET manufacturers, the
EPA made a series of concessions over a five-year period in response
to industry’s petitions for reconsideration.221 Presumably the agency
hoped to mollify the industry’s concerns through these negotiations.
The EPA’s concessions ultimately proved insufficient to prevent
in court).
217. See Jeffrey M. Gaba, Informal Rulemaking by Settlement Agreement, 73 GEO. L.J.
1241, 1245-48 (1985) (discussing rulemaking settlements).
218. See, e.g., William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory
Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1368-69 (1997)
(debating the benefits of regulatory negotiation).
219. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Portland Cement
Manufacturing Industry, 67 Fed. Reg. 16,614, 16,615 (Apr. 5, 2002) (amending previous rule
which had been challenged by the American Portland Cement Alliance).
220. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Portland Cement
Manufacturing Industry, 67 Fed. Reg. 44,371, 44,371 (July 2, 2002) (discussing how seventeen
provisions agreed to in the settlement did not receive adverse comment but seven
amendments did receive adverse comment and were thus withdrawn); see also infra Figure
4.
221. Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L. v. EPA, 323 F.3d 1088, 1090-91 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Specifically, industry petitioned the EPA twice and each petition led to some budging by the
EPA—first a public hearing and then amendments to the rule. See National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutant Emissions: Group IV Polymers and Resins, 66 Fed.
Reg. 40,903, 40,903 (Aug. 6, 2001); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants: Group IV Polymers and Resins, 64 Fed. Reg. 30,456, 30,456-58 (June 8, 1999).
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litigation, and yet the process of repeat reconsideration of the rule
undoubtedly took a toll on agency resources. 
Indeed, because these settlements are sometimes secret, the
extent to which post-rule settlements drain agency resources is
difficult to estimate.222 From the information available in the air
toxic rules, it appears that the EPA engaged in a significant level of
post-final rule petition activity. At least one-third of the ninety rules
triggered petitions for reconsideration or notices of appeal.223
Because most of these petitions did not lead to an appeal resulting
Figure 4: Chronology of EPA’s Effort to Settle Rulemaking
Claims with the American Portland Cement Alliance,
Comprised Exclusively of Regulated Parties
 
Final 
Rule 
2000 2005
Notice of 
settlement 
Proposed rule 
amendments and 
direct final rule 
amendments based 
on settlement 
Partial 
withdrawal of 
amendments (17 
changes finalized; 
7 withdrawn) 
Final rule 
clarifications/ 
corrections 
Final rule 
amendments 
222. Some and perhaps most of the settlements and negotiations are not recorded in the
rule docket or published in the Federal Register, so their prevalence and resource demands
remain largely mysterious. See, e.g., Gaba, supra note 217, at 1254 (discussing potential
secrecy of rulemaking settlements).
223. See infra Appendix 2.
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in judgment, moreover, it appears that at least some of the chal-
lenges to the rules were settled rather than voluntarily withdrawn
by interest group challengers.224
Finally, judicial review may impose invisible, but potentially more
significant, costs on the agency by creating incentives for the agency
to compromise substantive features of the rules in an effort to
minimize the threat of appeals. For example, the agency might
make changes preemptively in its final or even in its proposed rule
in response to comments that raise a credible threat of litigation,
unless there are countervailing agency policies that are too sig-
nificant to ignore.225 Indeed, if the agency is intent on getting a rule
through the process expeditiously, it may work closely with the
litigious groups throughout the development of the rule in an effort
to neutralize their opposition.226 Mollifying litigious groups during
rule development or during the comment process could go a long
way to lower the agency’s litigation risks. 
The effect of these litigation-based incentives on agency behavior
is well accepted in administrative law.227 As Professor Strauss
observes, “the very act of being hauled into court and required to
defend its action involves considerable costs [to the agency]....
Hence, parties who are capable of imposing such costs at the end of
the regulatory process become parties whose interests must be
reckoned with during the regulatory process.”228 This influence
likely occurs during multiple points of the process, moreover,
including the development of the proposed rule, the notice-and-
comment process, and further clarifications, amendments, or other
addenda to a final rule after it is published. An attorney steeped in
administrative process expands on this view based on his personal
experience:
The reason that the Agency is generally receptive to well-
reasoned technical comments.... [is] not only because they want
224. See, e.g., Wagner et al., supra note 9, at 130 (discussing the fact that the number of
petitions filed by industry exceeds the number of appeals filed by the same).
225. See id. at 131 (discussing this possibility).
226. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 79, at 1380-83 (discussing the importance of the rule
development process to minimizing litigation risks for an agency).
227. See, e.g., id. at 1387-88 (recounting some literature on this point).
228. PETER STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1121 (9th ed.
1995).
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to appear to be reasonable and responsive to public comments,
but also because their willingness to refine a regulatory
program—to address identified flaws in the program—should
help that program withstand judicial review.229
Yet if the EPA truly seeks to minimize its litigation risks by
giving higher priority to comments that raise appealable issues,
then the more litigious and heavily engaged groups are likely to
enjoy greater influence in EPA rules.230 In the case of the EPA’s air
toxic rules, these more engaged groups are likely to be industry, in
part because they possess superior access to the relevant infor-
mation and in part because the complexity and technicality of the
rules may impede participation by more thinly financed groups.231 
To the extent that industry dominance corresponds with credible
threats of litigation, which in turn translates into greater influence
over the substance of the final rules, however, judicial review may
be setting back protection of the public health rather than ad-
vancing it, at least on balance. Besieged by dozens of litigatable
issues by industry, and only a few, if any, by public interest groups,
the agency will find itself substantively leaning toward industry
simply to survive judicial oversight. As one EPA official remarked
with respect to the heavy involvement of industry in the rule devel-
opment stage: “We help them; they help us.”232 
229. Andrea Bear Field & Kathy E.B. Robb, EPA Rulemakings: Views from Inside and
Outside, 5 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 1990, at 9, 50 (quoting an experienced
administrative law attorney in D.C.).
230. See, e.g., MURRAY J. HORN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 64-65
(1995) (noting how affected interest groups who wield the threat of litigation enjoy enhanced
power over rulemakings); WILLIAM F. WEST, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING 188 (1985)
(arguing how judicial review may be used as a lever by industry to gain concessions from an
agency); Philip K. Howard, Keynote Address: Administrative Procedure and the Decline of
Responsibility, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 312, 318 (1996) (“[T]he power is held by interest groups and
others who can afford the lawyers to play the process and go to the courts.”); Mashaw, supra
note 161, at 17 (“Judicial review ... gives important legal armaments to obstructionist
elements in the agencies’ regulatory space. Every rule is contestable on a host of possible legal
and factual grounds and a reviewing court’s reaction to these complaints is often
unpredictable.”); see also Michael C. Harper, The Case for Limiting Judicial Review of Labor
Board Certification Decisions, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 262, 270-79 (1987) (discussing this
phenomenon in the context of judicial review of NLRB decisions); cf. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 36 (1938) (noting that “the umpire theory of administering law” is
not likely to prevail because of the skew in resources among affected parties).
231. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 79, at 1380-88.
232. Coglianese, supra note 124, at 14.
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These predicted disparities in participation and influence in fact
occurred in the EPA’s air toxic rules and with relatively significant
levels of imbalance and input. Just during the development of the
proposed rules, industry had more than eighty informal commu-
nications, on average, with the EPA, as compared with fewer than
one communication, on average, for the public interest groups for
these same rules.233 Industry also dominated the comment process
with about seventeen industry comments for every one public
interest group comment. For more than half the rules, moreover,
public interest groups did not even provide a single comment.234
Even if the agency is otherwise inclined to favor public interest
groups, the incentives created by litigation could lead agency staff
to err on the side of appeasing the most vocal groups in order to get
a rule finalized in a reasonable time frame.235 
Even more to the point, this imbalance in comment activity
appears to be taking a toll on the substance of the resulting rules.
The air toxic rules became weaker from the proposed to final
version: 82% of the changes the EPA made to each final rule, on
average, involved weakening it in some way, and the number of
industry commenters significantly correlated with the number of
changes that the EPA made to weaken a rule—about one weakening
change for every two industry commenters.236 No similar correlation
233. See infra Table 2 & Appendix 2. There is no readily available record of the extent of
pre-NPRM negotiations occurring on the early Clean Water Act standards, but one gets a
sense from the Coggins & McGarity account that this early exchange during the rulemaking
process was quite limited. See Coggins & McGarity, supra note 110, at 9 (discussing agency
reticence to heed industry criticisms and agency tendency, in some cases, to outright ignore
industry criticisms). This noncommunication during rule development may in fact explain the
high rate of industry challenges that resulted in appellate decisions under the Clean Water
Act and the nearly mirror image of challenges, brought almost exclusively by environmental
groups, for otherwise similar HAPs technology-based standards, which appear to have been
crafted after several years of intensive negotiations and discussions with industry before the
agency even issued the proposed rule. 
234. See infra Figure 5 and accompanying text. 
235. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 25, at 1315-22 (discussing the skew in favor of regulated
parties more generally as an adverse side effect of judicial review). But see Funk, supra note
218, at 1386 (In contrast to negotiated rulemaking, “the agency still determines the public
interest. Modern rulemaking has not substituted interest representation theory for traditional
notions of administrative rulemaking.”).
236. Wagner et al., supra note 9, at 135 (reporting a correlation coefficient of .54 between
industry commenters and changes made to weaken the final rule, which was statistically
significant at the 99% confidence level).
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exists between the public interest comments and changes made to
strengthen the rule.237 Industry also filed more petitions for recon-
sideration against air toxic rules as compared with public interest
groups, even though it took only one of these petitions to judg-
ment.238 
This imbalanced participation and influence by industry in the
EPA’s air toxic rules occurred consistently across both the Clinton
and George W. Bush administrations.239 Although the data reveal
little about the significance of the individual changes made to
weaken rules, they do indicate that both the Clinton and Bush EPAs
were very receptive to informal contacts with industry and that both
EPAs weakened the rules in response to comments at roughly the
same rate.240 Moreover, and as mentioned previously, more than
half of the rules appealed to the courts were drafted in principle by
the Clinton EPA.241 Nevertheless, the Bush EPA was present
through all of the judicial remands and is thus primarily responsible
for the EPA’s delays in repairing the rules, as well as for some of the
more egregious forms of nonacquiescence and legal risk taking
evidenced in the two 2007 cases.242
237. Id.
238. Id. at 129 (providing a data table on this point).
239. See, e.g., Katherine Barnes, Wendy Wagner & Lisa Peters, Presidential Politics Meets
Regulatory Complexity: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Hazardous Air Pollutant Rules Under
Clinton and Bush II 14-15 (July 16, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641551.
240. See id. at 16-17.
241. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
242. See infra Appendix 1.
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Table 2: Interest Group Engagement and Influence in All
Ninety Air Toxic Rules243
Informal 
Pre-NPRM
Communications
Comments
During
N&C
Changes Made
by EPA to
Weaken the
Final Rule
After N&C244
Changes
Made by
EPA to
Strengthen
the Final
Rule After
N&C
Total
Petitions
for Recon-
sideration
and Court
Filings 
Industry 83 35 11 N/A 20% of
rules
(N=18)
Public
Interest
Groups
1
(comments were
filed in only 47%
of rules)
2 N/A 2 14% of
rules
(N=13)
244
This additional evidence of extensive exchanges between the
agency and industry brings new meaning to the dazzling litigation
successes of the public interest groups. If industry is in fact enjoying
substantial victories during the rulemaking process, then its failure
to appeal may simply reflect the fact that it has few issues of sub-
stance left to litigate. Certainly industry’s failure to appeal rules is
not due to the fact that it lacks standing to sue, nor does it seem
likely, after such heavy engagement in the rule development and
comment process, that industry lacks resources to press claims
through to litigation.245 
243. Note that the litigated rules fall within one standard deviation of this mean on
virtually all measures. See infra Appendix 2.
244. It is assumed that changes weakening the rule are attributable to industry and
changes strengthening the rule are attributable to public interest groups. It is likely that
there in fact is not always a one-to-one match; as a result, the quantitative data do not
correlate precisely to interest groups on this variable. In further research, the actual
comments of industry and public interest groups will be coded to determine the reliability of
this assumption.
245. As mentioned earlier, the scarcity of appeals from industry is a surprise. A number
of administrative law scholars discuss how the cost-benefit analysis of challenging agency
rules in court should lead to greater use of the courts by industry rather than by the public
interest groups. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 25, at 1255 (observing the benefits of judicial
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At the same time, public interest groups may be the primary
litigants for this same reason: industry enjoyed a disproportionate
influence in the rulemaking process. The fact that the courts
identified multiple flaws with the EPA’s interpretation of the stat-
ute from the perspective of the public interest lends still more
support to the possibility that the rules emerging from this skewed
process are tilted too far toward industry.246
To the extent that judicial review is undermining the public in-
terest in a significant subset of rules, however, a paradox emerges.
On the one hand, the courts appear to be an important, and perhaps
the only, institutional tool available to hold the complex but wrong-
headed rules up to the public light once they are challenged.247 On
the other hand, the courts may offer the most resourceful partic-
ipants still greater legal leverage than they already enjoy, par-
ticularly for rules that are devoid of public interest engagement.248
The final part of this Article takes up this paradox in more detail.
IV. REVISITING THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON AGENCY
RULEMAKINGS
The interaction between the courts, the EPA, and interest groups
in the entire set of air toxic rules defies simple generalization. At
one end of the spectrum, some of the air toxic rules epitomize the
operation of the interest group representation model in its full glory.
In these rules, all affected interests engage intensely in the rule-
making process, and their participation, particularly through
review to regulated parties because they “can at minimum defer these [compliance] costs for
perhaps years while the issue is litigated”); see also MASHAW, supra note 199, at 186 (“[T]he
current structure of preenforcement review skews the incentives of participants fairly strongly
in the direction of litigation rather than compliance.”). The greater resources, coupled with
the benefits of delaying protective rules regardless of the likelihood of winning on the merits,
combine to create strong incentives for regulated parties to hold up rules as long as possible
in the courts. See, e.g., Schuck & Elliott, supra note 85, at 1011-12 (discussing how the delays
associated with appeals and remands provide incentives to appeal even when the probability
of prevailing on the merits is substantially less than fifty-fifty).
246. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
247. Cf. Cross, supra note 25, at 1274-75 (discussing the arguments that favor agencies
over courts in terms of accountability).
248. See supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
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judicial review, makes at least some difference to the final rules that
emerge.249 
At the other end of the spectrum, a sizable number of rules
exemplify the traditional model of judicial review characteristic of
the mid-1900s. In this set of rules, regulated parties are the ex-
clusive participants in the rulemaking process and appear to engage
primarily in order to protect their rights against arbitrary regu-
lation.250 
These two different models of interest group engagement in the
air toxic rulemaking process yield contrasting results with regard
to the ability of judicial review to advance the public interest. In this
Part, the two models are explored further. The analysis then closes
with some general questions that arise with regard to the courts’
influence, regardless of the diversity of interest group engagement.
A. Interest Group Representation Model
The litigated cases challenging the EPA’s air toxic emission
standards exemplify the critical role judicial review plays in
advancing the public interest. Public interest groups brought six of
the seven cases challenging the EPA’s air toxic emission standards
and won all but one of their appeals.251 In two of the opinions, both
decided by a panel of judges that had more Republican than
Democratic appointees,252 the court berated the EPA for a series of
interpretive errors that the court held violated its statutory
mandate in ways that undermined public health protection.253 On
most of the issues for which the EPA’s rules were vacated and
remanded, moreover, the courts found that the EPA had not only
ignored its statutory limits but had also ignored the courts’ own
precedent. As one of the panels concluded: “The agency’s errors
could not be more serious insofar as it acted unlawfully, which is
more than sufficient reason to vacate the rules.”254
249. See supra Part III.A.1.
250. This one-sided engagement by regulated industry occurs despite clear public health
implications of the rules promulgated by the EPA. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
251. See supra Part III.A.1.
252. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
253. See generally Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Sierra
Club II, 479 F.3d 875 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
254. Natural Res. Def. Council, 489 F.3d at 1374.
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The end result of these public interest victories was a series of
court opinions that constrain the EPA’s interpretation of the Clean
Air Act in ways that advance public health protection. When the
EPA attempted to implement a large exemption process in a section
of the Clean Air Act that did not contemplate such a loophole, the
court intervened to block the maneuver.255 When the EPA declined
to set standards for certain toxins because the best-performing
industries were not voluntarily installing pollution-control devices
to limit their emissions, the court demanded that the EPA recon-
sider and find a way to regulate the uncontrolled emissions.256
Without judicial review, these types of problematic EPA inter-
pretations would have been promulgated as binding rules.257 
The public interest group victories in the appeals of the air toxic
standards, particularly when set against the continuous industry
presence in the rules, leave little doubt that the interest group
representation model is alive and well.258 The courts serve as critical
watchdogs.259 Indeed, EPA staff may have celebrated the judicial
remands and reversals in all of these public interest suits because
at least a few of the EPA’s legally invalidated decisions appeared to
255. See id. at 1371-73.
256. See supra note 181.
257. See Sargentich, supra note 20, at 641 (arguing exactly this attribute of courts in
preventing the worst abuses of agencies by applying “law-governed checks by decisionmakers
not affected by the same political or institutional pressures facing executive branch officers”).
258. The case governing HAPs rules for brick kilns may be even more egregious in evincing
signs of possible capture of the EPA by industry. The proposed rule contained a number of
seemingly illegal decisions, including not only the five that were subject to condemnation by
the court on appeal, see Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d 875; see also infra Appendix 2, but also one
proposal the EPA dropped in the final rule because of comments—the same risk-based
exemption that ultimately failed in the plywood litigation. See National Emission Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Brick and Structural Clay Products Manufacturing; and
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Clay Ceramics Manufacturing,
68 Fed. Reg. 26,690, 26,706 (May 16, 2003) (explaining the EPA’s decision to not include a
risk-based exemption in the final rule based on comments received); see also Natural Res. Def.
Council, 489 F.3d at 1372 (striking down this risk-based exemption in the plywood rule). What
cannot be told from these cases given the small percentage of rules subject to litigation,
however, is whether the cases are exceptional or instead generally representative of the larger
set of HAPs rules. 
259. From the standpoint of thinly financed public interest groups, moreover, filing
comments and then appealing problematic rules may offer a more affordable means of
participating than engaging in extensive, informal negotiations with the agency throughout
the rulemaking process. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 1771. Given the heavy involvement of
industry, see infra Appendix 2, it would seem quite costly for the public interest groups to
attempt to keep up with these discussions and remain a meaningful presence throughout. 
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stem from politics, rather than from a good faith interpretation of
the statute by EPA career staff.260 
Reinforcing the public interest benefits to judicial review are
several secondary attributes of the courts’ oversight that are not
apparent from the data, but may be just as important. Ex ante, the
prospect of judicial review likely forced the agency to be clearer
about its decision-making process, particularly the changes it made
to the proposed rule. When it did not provide this kind of explan-
atory backdrop to the court’s satisfaction, the EPA faced a risk of
having its rule remanded for further explanation.261 In the air toxic
emission standards, in fact, three of the seven remands were based
in part on insufficient support or explanation.262 If the agency is able
to provide this type of explanation without incurring other types of
countervailing political costs, then the courts’ review provides useful
motivation for the agency to publish a more accessible and trans-
parent rule.
Additional transparency benefits also accrue ex post, after the
rulemaking is briefed and resolved by the court. The courts’ opinions
make the agency’s foibles more accessible to a broader audience,
allowing political and related forces to sanction and discipline the
agency.263 In his study of the effects of court opinions on agency
behavior, Professor Hume discusses how court rulings can trigger
press coverage and political pressure that in turn shine a much
brighter light on agency decisions.264 The briefing process even helps
260. See, e.g., HUME, supra note 25, at 74-75 (quoting agency officials who discuss how the
courts’ rulings give ammunition to resist political pressure from the White House or Congress
that takes the rulemaking too far out of the bounds of the statute); see also supra notes 186-89
and accompanying text. 
261. See generally Schroeder & Glicksman, supra note 111, at 10,405-11 (describing a
decade of cases in which EPA rules were remanded for failure to support the agency’s
reasoning).
262. See infra Appendix 3. The cases remanding the agency, at least in part on insufficient
factual justification, are Mossville Enviromental Action Now v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1232, 1242-43
(D.C. Cir. 2004), Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L. v. EPA, 323 F.3d 1088, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2003), and
National Lime II, 233 F.3d 625, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
263. See, e.g., Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and
Judicial Review of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 738, 778-79 (2011) (making this
argument with regard to the benefits of judicial review of agency science).
264. See, e.g., HUME, supra note 25, at 118.
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the parties themselves focus their arguments in ways not en-
couraged earlier in the rulemaking process.265 
The courts’ important role as communicator and translator is also
apparent qualitatively. The text box below compares the EPA’s own
convoluted explanation of a contested issue with the much more
accessible explanation provided by the court. While the court is
grappling with only a few issues—an advantage that likely helps
the court bring greater clarity to its description of the issue—the
court may also face stronger incentives to serve as a translator as
compared with the agency.266 When the EPA takes a position on a
controversial issue, for example, it is likely to be attacked not only
legally, but politically.267 One way to cope with this inevitable oppo-
sition is to offer up convoluted, though comprehensive, explanations
that support the agency’s decision instead of clear explanations
about how it resolved competing policy positions. The courts, on the
other hand, gain prestige in part by their ability to crystallize the
contested issues and place them into sharper focus in relation to the
statute.
265. Coglianese, supra note 124, at 160-61. One attorney even conceded that their appellate
brief was unsuccessful in part because the brief writers had failed to do an adequate job of
controlling information excess: the brief “was so filled with so many issues of such a technical
nature that I think we got lost in explaining basically how simple this one [issue] was.” Id. at
160 (alteration in original).
266. See, e.g., Meazell, supra note 263, at 780.
267. See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 199, at 184 (“The specter of administrative agencies
failing to protect the public health and safety, as they have been ordered to do by
congressional legislation, can often capture media attention and promote particular
legislators’ personal goals.”); MELNICK, supra note 74, at 322 (describing how the agency can
serve as “every elected official’s favorite whipping boy”).
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Text Box 2: A Comparison of the EPA’s and the Court’s
Descriptions of How the EPA Determined the Best-Performing
Facilities Within the Brick Kiln Industry for Establishing Its
Emission Standards
 
EPA’s Description The Court’s Description
Section 112(d)(3) of the CAA specifies that we set standards for
existing sources that are no less stringent than the average emission
limitation achieved by the best-performing 12 percent of existing
sources (for which the Administrator has emissions information)
where there are 30 or more sources in the category or subcategory.
Our interpretation of average emission limitation is that it is a
measure of central tendency, such as the arithmetic mean or the
median. If the median is used when there are at least 30 sources,
then the emission level achievable by the source and its APCD that
is at the bottom of the top 6 percent of the best-performing sources
(i.e., the 94th percentile) represents the MACT floor control level. We
based our MACT floors for each BSCP subcategory on this
interpretation. Nineteen percent (22 of 115) of the existing large
tunnel kilns located at synthetic minor sources or major sources are
controlled by a DLA (12), DIFF (4), DLS/FF (4), or WS (2). Because
more than 6 percent of the large tunnel kilns reduce emissions by
some technique, emissions reductions from these kilns are required
under the CAA. We then considered which of these controls are
proven to be applicable to existing tunnel kilns, and we ranked these
kilns to determine the appropriate MACT emission limits. We
consider the 12 DLA to be equivalent and believe that this type of
control can be applied to any existing large tunnel kiln without
causing potentially significant production problems. We consider the
performance of all of the DLA to be equivalent because there
currently are two types of DLA in the industry (supplied by two
manufacturers), and we have test data for both designs that show HF
removal efficiencies that are within 1 percent of one another. We
excluded DIFF and DLS/FF from our ranking of controls for existing
sources because of the reported problems caused by applying DIFF
and DLS/FF to existing kilns. We excluded WS from our ranking of
controls for existing sources because many facilities do not have
proven wastewater disposal options. Therefore, we only considered
DLA in our ranking, and accordingly, the 94th percentile source (the
7th best-controlled source) is a DLA-controlled kiln. Therefore, the
MACT floors for existing large tunnel kilns are based on the level of
control achieved by a DLA. We have DLA outlet test data for 7 of the
12 existing large DLA-controlled tunnel kilns, and therefore, we are
confident that our test data are within the best-controlled 6 percent
of sources. Furthermore, the single best-performing source, based on
our available DLA outlet data, is one of the three sources for which
a control efficiency is available.
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Brick
and Structural Clay Products Manufacturing; and National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Clay Ceramics
Manufacturing, 68 Fed. Reg. 26,690, 26,700 (May 16, 2003).
As discussed above, we held in Cement Kiln
that “EPA may not deviate from section
7412(d)(3)’s requirement that floors reflect
what the best performers actually achieve by
claiming that floors must be achievable by all
sources using MACT technology.” 255 F.3d at
861. In setting the floor for existing large
tunnel brick kilns, however, EPA did just
that. [discussing and quoting from EPA’s rule
and justification].... EPA argues that it has
“reasonably construe[d] the term ‘best
performing’ ... to allow it to consider whether
retrofitting kilns with a particular pollution
control technology is technically feasible.”
Resp’t’s Br. 27. But EPA cannot circumvent
Cement Kiln’s holding that section 7412(d)(3)
requires floors based on the emission level
actually achieved by the best performers
(those with the lowest emission levels), not
the emission level achievable by all sources,
simply by redefining “best performing” to
mean those sources with emission levels
achievable by all sources. See 255 F.3d at 861.
Moreover, EPA’s rationales for excluding
kilns equipped with non-DLA technology
from its ranking of the best-performing large
tunnel kilns (the infeasibility of retrofitting
all kilns with certain non-DLA technology
and the negative impact other non-DLA
technology would have on productivity)
amount to nothing more than a concern about
ensuring that its floor is achievable by all
kilns in the subcategory-precisely the position
we rejected in Cement Kiln. 
Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d 875, 880-81 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
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Together, these judicial attributes mark the triumph of the
interest group representation model in advancing the public
interest. Liberalized standing rules do indeed allow public interest
groups to exert a meaningful presence in EPA rulemakings.268
Equally importantly, the appeal process allows these groups to
bring critical legal questions about the agency’s rules to the
attention of the media, the public, and the political branches.269 
B. The Traditional Model, Revisited
In contrast to the vigorous pluralistic and judicial oversight
afforded to the air toxic standards discussed in the last Section, a
sizable subset of air toxic standards—more than half—involves no
public interest participation at all. Interest group engagement in
this subset of rules is largely one-sided: regulated industry ef-
fectively monopolizes the entire rulemaking process—from rule
development, to notice and comment, to filing petitions for recon-
sideration.270
Despite the absence of public interest engagement, the public
interest is nevertheless directly affected by these standards. Every
one of the EPA’s air toxic rules imposes limits on the toxic emissions
of large industries and requires these facilities to reduce their
pollution.271 Moreover, because the sources covered by the Act are
“major” and emit more than ten tons per year of air toxins, the
reductions are likely significant in quantity because they ultimately
reduce net emissions by a considerable percentage.272 
The evidence also does not suggest that the rules without public
interest involvement were qualitatively less important to the public
health than those that did attract public interest comments.273 The
EPA’s toxic emission standard for PVC manufacturers, for example,
lacked any public interest engagement274 yet it required reductions
268. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text.
270. It is worth noting that this subset of rules constitutes the majority, 53% (N=48), of the
EPA’s air toxic rules. See infra Figure 5.
271. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (2006).
272. Id. § 7412(a)(1), (d)(1).
273. See infra Appendices 1, 2.
274. See infra Appendix 2.
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of 3880 tons of emissions of these toxics annually, or about a 20%
reduction from base levels. 275 By comparison, Mossville, a case that
environmental groups actually litigated,2 76 involved fewer emission
reductions-only about 400 tons of air toxins per year-from 28
facilities nationwide.2 77 Additionally, of the economically significant
rules promulgated by the EPA, rules that might be expected to
involve the greatest emission reductions because of their economic
consequences, more than 35% of the rules (N=14), did not involve
public interest group comment.278
Figure 5: Public Interest Group Engagement in HAPs Rules
HAPs rules that
involved at least one
comment from public
interest groups
Rules involving no
public interest
comment or litigation
activity
HAPs rules that public interest
groups appealed to judgment
275. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET 1 (June 20, 1996), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/pr4/grivfact.pdf.
276. The petitioners were Mossville Environmental Action Now and the Sierra Club.
Mossville Envtl. Action Now v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1232, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
277. See U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET 1 (Dec. 4, 2000), available at http://www.
epa.gov/ttn/atw/pvc/pvc-fs.pdf.
278. See infra Appendices 1, 2.
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Thus, although all of the EPA’s air toxic rules might benefit from
pluralistic oversight, such oversight is not occurring in the majority
of the standards.279 Instead, engagement by interest groups in the
majority of the air toxic rules comes much closer to the traditional
or due-process model common in the mid-1900s.280 In this model,
courts are brought in exclusively by the regulated parties “to cabin
administrative discretion within statutory bounds” and to require
that “agencies ... follow decisional procedures designed to promote
the accuracy, rationality, and reviewability of agency application of
legislative directives [with respect to their interests].”281 In its
engagement with the air toxic rules, in fact, industry’s primary
comments concerned the feasibility, cost, practicality, and timeline
of the EPA’s emission standards. Industry rarely, if ever, advocated
for greater health protection.282 
A good illustration of this traditional or due-process model of
administrative process is a HAPs rule that applies to polymer
manufacturers. In this particular rule, the EPA proposed emission
limits on a handful of carcinogenic air toxics emitted from about
sixty-six plants that manufactured polyester fibers, soft drink
bottles, and various plastic parts and toys.283 Despite the relatively
clear public health implications for these emission standards, there
was no public interest group participation.284 By contrast, industry
and industry associations engaged in more than 450 contacts with
the agency before the proposed rule was even published.285 At com-
ment time, industry was again the dominant participant, effectively
monopolizing notice and comment: there were thirty-six industry
commenters and one state commenter, but not a single commenter
from the public interest community. In response to these comments,
the EPA made twenty changes that further weakened the rule and
rejected only six comments.286 No significant comments were made
279. See supra Figure 5.
280. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 1669.
281. Id. at 1670.
282. This is based on the review of more than thirty individual industry comments filed on
air toxic rules as well as on the larger data indicating statistical correlations between industry
commenters and changes to the rules that weaken the rules. See infra Appendix 2.
283. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 275, at 1-3.
284. See infra Appendix 2.
285. More than 300 of these contacts were informal. See infra Appendix 2.
286. See infra Appendix 2.
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urging the EPA to strengthen the rule.287 Still unhappy, two
individual industry petitioners appealed the rule to the D.C. Circuit,
arguing that the EPA arbitrarily failed to consider the excessive
costs of the monitoring requirements.288 In Arteva Specialties
S.A.R.L. v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the EPA’s rule was
arbitrary on this issue and vacated and remanded the rule to the
agency in 2003.289 The court’s opinion, for which the panel comprised
one Republican and two Democratic appointees,290 focused like a
laser on the very specific factual complaints of the industry
petitioners—namely, that evidence suggested that the EPA’s mon-
itoring requirements were not cost-effective in detecting violations
from equipment leaks for all affected industries, as opposed to other
types of monitoring equipment—and found them compelling.291 
If there are no public interest commenters available to file suit,
the agency can ignore its mandate in ways that detrimentally
impact the public health.292 And while the interest group repre-
sentation model should not be interpreted literally to require an
active public interest presence in all rules, in reality if public
interest groups are absent from most of the rules, then the interest
group representation model seems to poorly characterize what ac-
tually occurs in practice. 
Even when the agency does attempt to advance the public interest
based on internal ideological or political directives, the agency faces
counter pressure from litigation-backed comments filed by industry,
which could delay the standards for years while the litigation is
being resolved. At least in the air toxic rules, however, the evidence
287. See infra Appendix 2.
288. Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L. v. EPA, 323 F.3d 1088, 1089, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
289. Id. at 1088, 1092.
290. Circuit Judges Harry T. Edwards, Karen LeCraft Henderson, and Judith W. Rogers
composed the panel. See id. at 1089. Judges Edwards and Rogers were Democratic appointees,
and Judge Henderson was a Republican appointee.
291. Id. at 1091.
292. See generally McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969) (setting out the
reasons for exhausting remedies first within the agency before raising the issue with the
court). In his study of OSHA, Patrick Schmidt documents the greater influence that follows
the submission of comments as compared to more informal input that does not serve as the
basis for appeal. See Patrick Schmidt, Pursuing Regulatory Relief: Strategic Participation and
Litigation in U.S. OSHA Rulemaking, 4 BUS. & POL. 71, 77-78 (2002). Obviously, however,
there still can be political consequences if the agency’s violations are caught and found
offensive to politically powerful constituents.
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reveals that the EPA favors industry in the final rules, regardless
of presidential administration.293 
Seen from this perspective, the high success rate of public interest
groups’ appeals may simply be an indication of just how problematic
the larger set of air toxics rules are and may foreshadow the sub-
stantial mop-up work that the courts and public interest litigators
have ahead of them. Recall that in rules that involve only industry
comments and related communications, judicial review is generally
available only to industry and thus advances only industry’s
concerns.294 To the extent these industry concerns are mutually
exclusive with advancing the public interest, an administrative
process backed by a threat of appeal, but monopolized or at least
dominated by industry, will thus tend to move the public interest
goals backward, rather than forward. 
The limited body of empirical work that traces the interest
groups’ engagement in rulemakings is largely congenial to the
findings reached here regarding the possibility of strong industry
domination and influence in the majority of rules. The major
empirical studies report that public interest groups filed comments
in less than half of the rules under study; in the half of the rules
that did involve diverse comments, industry was still the dominant
participant.295 This research also shows industry dominance of, or
293. Although the aggregate or net effect of these litigation pressures appears to cause the
EPA to lean heavily in favor of industry, the EPA does put up a fight in some cases. For
example, the EPA rejected 18% of significant comments to weaken the rule, thus suggesting
that litigation threats may not always be decisive. See infra Appendix 2. In the emission
standard ultimately challenged in Arteva, for example, the EPA resisted weakening certain
monitoring requirements, despite the fact that industry launched two separate petitions for
reconsideration over five years. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. In a few rules the
EPA even decided to strengthen a rule despite the absence of a meaningful public interest
group presence during the comment process. See infra Appendix 2.
294. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
295. See Maureen L. Cropper et al., The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical
Analysis of EPA Decision Making, 100 J. POL. ECON. 175, 178, 187 (1992) (examining interest
group engagement in pesticide registrations between 1975 and 1989 and finding
environmentalists participated in 49% of the cancellations); Marissa Martino Golden, Interest
Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB.
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 253-54 (1998) (studying eight rules promulgated by EPA and
NHTSA, using content analysis to determine who participates and influences federal
regulations, and finding no citizen engagement in five of the eight rules); Yackee & Yackee,
supra note 9, at 131, 133 (studying forty lower-salience rulemakings promulgated by four
different federal agencies and finding that business interests submitted 57% of comments,
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at least heavy engagement in, the litigation that follows promul-
gation of a final rule.296 
C. The Limits of the Courts
The data also reveal some stark limits to the courts’ influence
over agency decision making, regardless of whether the interest
group oversight is diverse and pluralistic or exclusively dominated
by industry.297 In the air toxic rules, only a small percentage (8%) of
whereas nonbusiness or nongovernmental organizations submitted 22% of comments, of which
6% came from public interest groups); Coglianese, supra note 124, at 73 tbl.2-2 (finding that
businesses participated in 96% of rules and that national environmental groups participated
in 44%).
296. Professor Coglianese, for example, found that industry was by far the most dominant
challenger in filing appeals to economically significant RCRA rules between 1987 and 1991.
This was also during the Reagan administration, and public interest groups were doing
particularly vigorous battle with the administration over hazardous waste policies.
Specifically, about 90% of the lead plaintiffs in the appeals of the RCRA rules were
corporations or trade associations representing industry; indeed “the dominance of industry
groups as participants in litigation becomes even more pronounced” as compared with the
notice-and-comment period. Coglianese, supra note 124, at 100-01.
There is also strong qualitative evidence of industry dominance in the litigation over the
EPA’s Clean Water Act technology-based standard-setting rulemakings. See supra note 104
and accompanying text; see also LETTIE M. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT
50-51 (1982) (describing industry’s appeal of EPA’s Clean Water Act discharge standards).
By contrast, Dr. Wenner’s research on interest group use of the courts in the 1970s and
1980s to challenge agency rules revealed that environmental groups brought the greatest
number of cases in the court of appeals in the early 1970s. See id. at 41, 43; Lettie McSpadden
Wenner, Interest Group Litigation and Environmental Policy, 11 POL’Y STUD. 671, 673-74
(1983). Business then caught up and exceeded environmental appeals by the late 1970s,
although by what appears to be only a 10 to 20% greater number of appeals filed. See Wenner,
supra note 110, at 46 fig.3.2. In terms of success rates on appeal, the two groups stayed
relatively close to one another. Id. at 51 fig.3.4. It should be noted that Dr. Wenner’s data
include both the appeal of enforcement cases as well as appellate challenges to rules.
297. Professor Mashaw, apparently in anticipation of a gap between court opinions and
agency behavior, argues that agency statutory interpretation should be studied as an
autonomous enterprise, with its own forces, incentives, and methodologies that are often
wholly independent from the courts. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 54, at 900-01 (discussing
how agencies respond to presidents and thus are likely to take risks to advance presidential
politics, and concluding that “[a]gencies who never lose in court are probably not doing their
jobs”). Although Professor Mashaw does not directly take up the issue of nonacquiescence, his
preliminary sketch of agency incentives identifies a number of competing reasons that
agencies may decide to take litigation risks and underscores the inevitable ambiguities that
most judicial opinions hold with respect to future agency policies. Mashaw, supra note 25, at
515 (“[G]iven the context of most judicial constructions of agency statutes ... it is often unclear
what binding force the judicial interpretation was meant to have for future policy.”). 
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the rules were actually appealed to judgment.298 This low rate of
appeals is reinforced by similar findings in several other empirical
studies. The direct radius of the courts’ influence, then, extends over
only a small percentage of the total set of rules. Although the
resulting appeals and court opinions set precedent, the fewer the
cases, the more limited the opportunities for courts to provide
meaningful oversight of agency rulemakings. 
The limitations of the courts’ remedial powers are also apparent
in the air toxic rules. The courts remanded five rules from 2000 to
2007, and only one has been repaired.299 Even when the EPA’s
repromulgation is governed by a consent decree with petitioners, the
EPA lags well behind schedule.300 The air toxic rules may be
aberrational in the long period it takes the EPA to repair rules on
remand, although the courts’ more general limitations in effec-
tuating their judgments are well known in administrative law.301 
Even the courts’ precedential impact on the EPA’s air toxic rule-
making project must be qualified because the agency resisted
following the courts’ instructions on several important interpre-
tations.302 The EPA did not explicitly nonacquiesce with respect to
this precedent, but it did seem to ignore or at least creatively
distinguish important statutory guidance by courts in cases decided
in 2000 and 2001.303 The EPA also took risks in the creative inter-
pretation of its statutory authority that the agency openly ac-
knowledged were vulnerable to judicial invalidation, but it per-
severed for reasons that appear largely political.304 The possibility
that political influence can sometimes trump litigation risks is not
necessarily unprecedented; as Professor Christopher Edley notes,
“[P]olitics is lurking in almost every agency decision and in every
298. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
299. See supra Table 1.
300. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 158-59 and 179-93 and accompanying text.
302. It is assumed for the sake of simplicity that the courts’ environment-leaning
interpretations in the cases that environmental groups won will advance the public interest
more than the agency’s vacated interpretations. This assumption is contestable, however. 
303. See, e.g., Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d 875, 880-83 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (chastising EPA for
ignoring National Lime II, 233 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2000), and Cement Kiln, 255 F.3d 855 (D.C.
Cir. 2001)).
304. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
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corner of administrative law.”305 Yet if the agencies consider the
courts only to be one constraint, and a small one at that, then that
fact calls into question the ability of the courts to deter the agency
from straying from its mandate, even in cases where the agency’s
interpretation appears facially at odds with the statute.306 Again,
seen through this light, the courts’ strongly worded opinions and
repeat warnings could be read to do no more than fire a few shots
across the bow of an agency that is otherwise relatively unfazed by
the courts’ opinions that limit its discretion. 
One should not overstate the EPA’s willingness to risk challenges
and adverse judgments from the courts. There are ambiguities and
even inconsistencies in some of the earlier opinions interpreting the
air toxic provisions of the Clean Air Act, and it is possible that the
EPA simply believed in good faith that subsequent standard-setting
applications presented facts that were unique enough to allow it to
distinguish these earlier cases. Presumably, too, after the court
issued a second, firmer opinion remanding the rule on a Chevron
Step One error, the EPA will either follow or distinguish the prec-
edent in a much more rigorous way in subsequent rules.307 
Nevertheless, the evidence does raise questions about the extent
to which unwelcome court opinions present binding constraints on
agency action. If it in fact turns out that the courts only occasionally
influence future agency decision making, then the benefits of
305. CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
BUREAUCRACY 170 (1990).
306. Stewart also raises this concern about the effects of judicial review on social regulation
under the interest group representation model. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 1804 (expressing
concern that because of the multiple constraints acting on the agency, “[t]he amelioration of
agency bias wrought by the judicial system may thus be largely cosmetic”).
307. For example, the EPA presumably now believes it simply cannot interpret the statute
to provide a risk-based exemption to emission limits for major industries. See, e.g., Natural
Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1250, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The EPA may also appreciate
that in all HAPs rules it must set limits on listed air toxins, even when the 88% best
technological process does not control for them and it cannot ignore nonproduction bases for
limiting emissions. See Nat’l Lime II, 233 F.3d at 628, 631, 633-34. If facilities can limit toxic
emissions through means that do not involve inputs—for example, by pollution
prevention—then this entire suite of operational approaches is fair game in determining what
the best available technologies can accomplish. See supra Text Box 1. Thus, there are reasons
to believe that the agency now views several of the courts’ rulings as hard constraints that
apply across all rules and that will be honored regardless of who engages individually in those
rulemaking efforts.
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judicial review may be more limited than initially thought and
should be set against other costs, such as the possibility that the
agency may compromise the substance of its rules in order to avoid
delays and other resource drains associated with litigation.
CONCLUSION
This Study of EPA’s air toxic rules reveals potentially significant
problems in the viability of the pluralistic model in settings when
interest groups have dramatically different resources available to
participate. At least in the air toxic rulemakings, diverse interest
group oversight is the exception rather than the rule. Moreover,
even in the minority of cases when a full set of interested parties is
engaged in a rulemaking and the stakeholders deploy the courts to
review problematic rules, the data reveal that the EPA may ignore
or at least limit the courts’ commands through creative inter-
pretations of the precedent. Although the courts’ role in individual
cases as guardians of the public interest is uncontestable, on the
whole judicial review proves less influential than is generally
expected. Indeed, the net effect of judicial review may well be to
provide regulated industries with legal leverage that, in the
aggregate, actually undermines the agency’s ability to act on behalf
of the public. 
The results of this Study also spotlight the need for further
empirical study of the judicial review of agency rulemakings. The
current design of administrative process, which relies heavily on
interest groups to hold the agencies accountable, emerged in the
1970s at a time when interest group participation was considerably
more evenly balanced between public interest groups and industry
participants. If these conditions are no longer present, then the
ability of some groups to dominate the regulatory process at the
expense of others deserves additional research and may warrant
reform.
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Appendix 1
General Information on Litigated Air Toxic Rules
This appendix contains all of the basic information on each litigated HAPs rule.
The data was collected from the case opinions, by citechecking the case to identify
petitions for rehearing or for cert, and by searching the Federal Register Unified
Agenda to determine the current status of each remanded rule.
In all appendices below, E= environmental group and I = industry group.
Rule subpart LLL JJJ J QQQ DDDD JJJJJ/
KKKKK
DDDDD
Case caption Nat’l 
Lime II
Arteva Mossville Sierra 
Club I
Natural Res.
Def.
Council
Sierra 
Club II
Natural
Res. Def.
Council
Industry Portland
cement
PET resin
mfr.
PVC type
facilities
Primary
copper
smelters
Plywood Brick kiln Boilers
Case cite 233 F.3d
625
323 F.3d
1088
370 F.3d
1232
353 F.3d 976 489 F.3d
1364
479 F.3d 875 489 F.3d
1250
Court date 2000 2003 2004 2004 2007 2007 2007
Final rule date 1999 2003 2002 2002 2004/06 2003 2004
Panel comp.
R = Republican
D = Democrat
1R/2D 1R/2D 2R/1D 2R/1D 2R/1D 2R/1D 2R
Unanimous? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes, w/ concur No
Economically
significant rule?
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes for brick
only (not clay)
Yes
President Clinton Crossover Crossover Crossover Bush II Bush II Bush II
Petitioners E & I Two Is E E E/I
intervened
E/I
intervened for
EPA
E/I
Won? Both Yes Yes, in part No Yes (E); 
No (I)
Yes (E) Yes (E)
# issues won 1 (I); 2(E) 1 1 0 2 (E) 5 1
# issues lost 1 (I); 2(E) 0 3 8 1 (I) 0 N/A
Vacated? No:
remand
only.
Stayed
with
respect to
petitioners.
Yes N/A Yes, but only
isolated
features of
rule.
Yes Yes
Petition for
rehearing or cert?
Reh’g
denied
No Reh’g
denied
Reh’g en banc
denied
No No No
Status of rule Final rule
(2010)
Not yet
repromul-
gated
Not yet
repromul-
gated 
N/A N/A Not yet
reprom-
ulgated
Not yet
reprom-
ulgated
1792 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1717
Appendix 2
Interest Group Involvement in Air Toxic Rules (all rules and
then by litigated rules individually)
The data on interest group engagement were collected by coding the docket
indices for each of the HAPs rules. The data on changes made to the rules were
collected by coding the changes the EPA listed in each final rule that constituted
significant changes from the proposed rule. For a fuller description of the
methods used to generate this information, see Wagner et al., supra note 9, app.
at 153.
Industry
informal 
pre-NPRM
communi-
cations
Industry
formal pre-
NPRM
communi-
cations
(pursuant to
information
requests)
Environmental
pre-NPRM
communications
State 
pre-NPRM
communi-
cations
Industry
comments
during N&C
Environ-
mental
comments
during N&C
State
comments
during N&C
Mean for
all rules
(N=90)
84.6
(SD=103.65)
85.90
(SD=150.14)
0.66 
(SD=3.56)
8.29 
(SD=14.11)
34.90
(SD=42.21)
2.38 
(SD=8.57)
5.32 
(SD=6.67)
Mean for
litigated
rules
152 156 0.16 7.8 38 2 5
DDDD 134 462 0 5 39 1 9
JJJJJ/
KKKKK
135 196 0 1 95 5 8
J 9 0 0 1 9 0 1
QQQ 109 15 0 10 22 2 4
LLL 221 111 1 23 28 4 7
JJJ 302 153 0 7 36 0 1
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Changes Made to the Air Toxic Rules (all rules and then by
litigated rules individually)
Changes made
weakening the rule
(mean) 
Changes made
strengthening the
rule (mean)
Rejecting
changes to
strengthen the
rule (mean)
Rejecting changes
to weaken the rule
(mean)
Mean for all rules
(N=90)
10.56 (SD=8.56) 2.14 (SD=3.21) 2.86 (SD=4.42) 6.03 (SD=7.40)
Mean for litigated
rules only
13.3 2 5.3 10.2
DDDD 39 3 21 27
JJJJJ/
KKKKK
10 1 8 13
J 1 1 2 0
QQQ 7 2 1 3
LLL 3 5 10 12
JJJ 20 0 0 6
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Appendix 3
Nature of Issues Decided in Litigation à la Chevron
This table identifies each of the issues reviewed by the D.C. Circuit in each of
the HAPs judicial appeals. The rows of the table are exactly the same as those
used by Schuck & Elliott, supra note 85, at 1032-33, although any rows without
data were omitted.  The data was collected by coding each issue raised in the
case. The table lists each issue in order (#) and identifies the page where the
court issued its opinion on the issue. 
Legend: REM = Remand; REJ = Reject; WIN = rule correction without remand
Case 
caption
Nat’l 
Lime II 
Nat’l 
Lime II 
Arteva Sierra Club I Mossville Sierra Club II Natural
Res. Def.
Council
Natural
Res. Def.
Council
Case cite 233 F.3d
625
323 F.3d
1088
353 F.3d 976 370 F.3d
1232
479 F.3d 875 489 F.3d
1364
Petitioner E I I E E E E I
Date of court
opinion
2000a
(same case)
2000b
(same case)
2003 2004 2004 2007 2007a
(same case
2007b
(same
case)
Remands for
errors of
substantive
law [Chevron
Step One]
REM: #2,
p.634
(control all
HAPs).
REJ: #1, p.983
(did not
violate statute
with PM
surrogate
approach –
only looked at
best – not an
interpretation
issue); 
#7, p.990
(EPA’s
reading is
reasonable
and so is
applying step
two  with
deference).
REM: #1,
p.880 (for
relation to
Mossville, see
p.882); #2,
p.882
(somewhat of
a hybrid –
worst to gauge
best); #3,
p.882
(nontechnical
factors); #4,
p.883 (no
control); #5,
p.884 (no basis
for doing work
practice
standards).
REM: #1,
p.1371 (low
risk ultra
vires/end-
run) [note
EPA
conceded
“no
controls
was also
violation,
so court did
not rule];
#2, p.1373
(no
extension).
Remands for
lack of
adequate
factual
support
REM: #3,
p.635
REJ: #1.
p.632;
 #4, p.635 
WIN: #6,
p.641
REJ:
#5, 
p.639
REM: #1,
p.1092
REJ: #1,
p.985; 
#2, p.986; 
#3, p.987; 
#4-6, pp.988-
90 
(lumped as
one);
REM: #3,
p.1242
REJ: #2,
pp. 1240-
42
(conflict
with
REJ;
EPA did
support
refusal to
subcate-
gorize
one
industry.
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 #9/10, pp.990-
92 (single).
National
Lime II
and
brick?)
Pp.1375-
76.
Misc. REJ: #11,
p.992 (ESA
not ripe yet).
Waived One issue was
waived, but
the court
actually
seemed to
consider a lot
of the claim
anyway.
Two
issues
were
waived
(#1).
